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Discovery of Expert Witnesses: Amending Rule
26(b)(4)(E) to Limit Expert Fee Shifting and Reduce
Litigation Abuses
Danielle M. Shelton†
The federal expert witness discovery rule makes sense in theory: it
provides for robust discovery of a testifying expert’s opinions while
requiring the opposing party to pay for the expenses related to its discovery
of those opinions, namely payment for the expert’s deposition. In practice,
though, the rule was not well-drafted and is fraught with problems that make
it unfair and inefficient.
First, the expert discovery rule strikes the wrong balance, which results
in the opposing party being forced to pay excessive amounts for the expert’s
work. Second, the expert discovery rule is vague and its contours are
unclear. This is particularly troubling because fee shifting of any kind is
almost unheard of in the federal courts, and in the rare occasions in which
it is mandated, such as for e-discovery, there exist clear procedures and
safeguards.‡ Not so, however, in the context of fee shifting for expert
discovery expenses. The rule is unclear and district courts disagree about
basic questions arising under the rule: Are an expert’s fees for traveling to
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and from a deposition included in the rule? Can an expert charge a higher
hourly rate for his deposition time than he charged the retaining attorney?
Can the expert make the other party pay in advance or refuse to sit for his
deposition? What is the court’s role in ensuring that only reasonable fees
are shifted despite the rule’s automatic nature? And because these issues
play out almost exclusively at the federal district court level and never reach
the appellate courts, these questions have no consistent or uniform answers,
despite having been litigated in district courts for almost twenty-five years.
None of this makes sense given the enduring and increasing role that
experts play in federal litigation. The expert fee shifting rule must be fixed
so that the opposing party only has to pay fees for work that it controls and
from which it benefits, and then only at a rate that is justified. Further, the
rule must be amended to provide clarity about the categories of fees that are
shifted as well as the process for shifting fees. Expert discovery is far too
common and too costly to have an automatic fee shifting rule that is unfair
and inefficient.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

While expert witnesses have long been a staple of federal litigation,
their use and related expenses are increasing.1 One such expense arises in
the area of expert discovery.2 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4)(E),
1 See Lance L. Shea, Ronn B. Kreps & Olufemi O. Solade, An Indispensable Force of
Persuasion: Navigating Expert Discovery, 2010 FOR THE DEFENSE 14, 15 (“Expert witnesses
play an increasingly common and crucial role in litigation today.”).
2 Over fifteen years ago, one commentator critiqued the high fees charged by experts
and the impact such fees have on the legal system:
The sky has really become the limit. For example, in some cases medical
experts are now demanding hourly rates of $700, $800, or even $1,000 or
more per hour for deposition testimony. Although such fees are usually
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which addresses discovery of expert opinions, provides that “[u]nless
manifest injustice would result, the court must require that the party seeking
discovery . . . pay the expert a reasonable fee for time spent in responding to
discovery.”3 In other words, if a party wants to depose the opposing expert,
it has to pay to do so. While this sort of fee shifting is seemingly
straightforward, the rule is fraught with problems.
Many of these problems arise from the rule’s lack of clarity—what, for
example, does “time spent responding to discovery” mean and what
differentiates “reasonable fees” from unreasonable fees? Other problems
arise from the rule’s failure to address key questions that arise under it,
including when fees are due and the logistics of fee shifting. Finally, some
problems with the rule arise from its overbreadth, which results in experts’
fees shifting to an opponent without justification.
These shortcomings of the expert discovery rule have real
consequences for litigants and courts. Not only is the use of experts a
mainstay of federal litigation,4 discovery—and, in particular, depositions—
of such experts is likewise routine.5 Unlike lay witnesses who are paid only
a nominal witness fee per day for their depositions regardless of their
profession,6 experts are expensive and are paid professional rates. With
typical rates that often exceed $500 per hour and reach upwards of $1000

excessive, sometimes these rates are paid, thereby perpetuating the notion
that it is the expert, and not the judicial system, that controls such fees.
Mark Canepa, Drawing the Line on Excessive Expert Witness Fees, MONDAQ,
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/10024/Drawing+The+Line+On+Excessive+Expert+
Witness+Fees (last updated Jan. 31, 2001).
3 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(E).
4 See Andrew W. Jurs, Expert Prevalence, Persuasion, and Price: What Trial
Participants Really Think About Experts, 91 IND. L.J. 353, 359 (2016) (“To recap, studies
have found that experts appear in between 63% and 86% of cases, with studies in the 1990s
showing between 4.1 and 4.8 experts per case and the newest study in 2005 finding 3.6 experts
per case.”).
5 See Amendments to the Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 401, 639 (1993)
(addressing the right to take the opposing expert’s deposition and stating that the report
disclosure requirement “may . . . eliminate the need for some such depositions or at least
reduce the length of the depositions”).
6 See Hillmann v. City of Chicago, No. 04 C 6671, 2017 WL 3521098, at *10 (N.D. Ill.
Aug. 16, 2017) (“‘The witness fee specified in § 1920(3) is defined in 28 U.S.C. § 1821,’
which provides that witnesses who travel to testify at trial or sit for a deposition must be paid
an ‘attendance fee’ of $40 per day and must be reimbursed for their travel and related
expenses.”) (first citing 28 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1), (b)–(c)(1), (c)(3)–(d)(1) (2012); and then
citing Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 440 (1987)).
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per hour7—or even “$12,000 per day”8 for experts that charge a flat fee—the
stakes are high for the opposing party to whom expert discovery fees are
shifted.9 The already high-stakes of expert fee shifting is made even more
costly, and even unfair, by the rule’s shortcomings. And because these
problems play out exclusively at the district court level, these shortcomings
have not been resolved at the appellate level.
This Article explores the myriad ways in which the expert discovery
rule falls short of its purpose and the ways in which it should be improved.
Part II discusses the existing rule, focusing on its key provisions, scope, and
purposes, and the larger procedural framework in which it operates. Part III
addresses the various and conflicting ways in which courts have interpreted
and applied the rule’s key provisions. Part IV addresses the negative
implications of the current rule that arise from its ambiguity and the balance
it strikes in favor of excessive fee shifting. Part V proposes amendments to
the rule that would minimize these problems and result in a rule that better
serves the purposes behind expert fee shifting. Many of these problems can
be solved by adding clarity and content to the rule, with the remaining
problems lessened by adding certain guidelines and presumptions into the
rule.
II.

THE BASICS OF THE EXPERT FEE SHIFTING RULE

A. Rule 26: Expert Discovery Obligations in General
The expert fee shifting provision is contained within Rule 26. Not only
does Rule 26 broadly address litigants’ discovery disclosures in general, it
includes several provisions relating exclusively to discovery-related
obligations for expert witnesses.10 That the expert fee shifting rule arises in
7 See Victoria Negron, Expert Witness Fee Report: Facts, Figures & Trends in 2017,
EXPERT INST. (Mar. 20, 2018), https://www.theexpertinstitute.com/expert-witness-fee-reportfacts-figures-trends-in-2017/ (surveying expert witnesses nationwide “across all industries
and areas of practice” and finding average deposition fees of $444.31 (Northeast), $407.51
(South), $415.20 (Midwest), and $380.05 (West)).
8 EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 5481 LBS AJP, 1999 WL 32909, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 1999) (retaining party demanded payment of $12,000 for one day of
deposition testimony by its expert).
9 It is not uncommon for the deposing party to have to pay six figures for the privilege
of deposing the other side’s expert. See, e.g., Neutral Tandem, Inc. v. Peerless Network, Inc.,
No. 08 C 3402, 2011 WL 13199213, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 1, 2011) (awarding “a total of
$48,020.00, pursuant to Rule 26(b)(4)(E)” for two experts’ depositions).
10 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, entitled “Duty to Disclose; General Provisions
Governing Discovery,” is divided into two parts: (a) “Required Disclosures” and (b)
“Discovery Scope and Limits.” Expert testimony is addressed in both parts. Part (a)
addresses, among other things, the “Disclosure of Expert Testimony,” and covers the timing
and content of disclosure of experts’ opinions. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2). That section
differentiates between the disclosure requirements for experts retained specifically for
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the context of Rule 26 is no coincidence; the various parts of Rule 26 are
designed to work in tandem.
Most notably, the shifting of discovery expert fees to the opposing
party11 is justified by the robust automatic disclosure rule that applies to most
experts.12 The broad expert disclosure rule requires that most experts
provide a complete and accurate disclosure of their opinions, the basis for
those opinions, and all information reviewed in forming that opinion.13 The
disclosure rule also requires most experts to disclose information about,
among other things, their background, experience, expertise, and rates.14
Because of the broad disclosure requirements, Rule 26 anticipates that it will
be unnecessary for the expert to be deposed or, even if deposed, for the
deposition to be significantly shorter than it would be without the
disclosures.15 In addition, the right to depose an opposing expert16 is
balanced by the obligation to pay the expert for her deposition time.17 By
making the opposing party pay for the deposition, the rule assures that the
party that retained the expert will not have to pay the expert for work that the
party did not request nor benefit from, such as the expert’s deposition. Yet,
at the same time, the rule permits the free and liberal discovery of
information, which is a cornerstone of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.18
purposes of litigation and other experts, and only requires the former to provide reports. Part
(b) addresses, among other matters, “Trial Preparation: Experts.” Namely, Rule 26(b)(4)
provides that:

“A party may depose any person who has been identified as an expert whose opinions
may be presented at trial.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(A);

“[D]rafts of any report or disclosure required under Rule 26(a)(2), regardless of the form
in which the draft is recorded[,]” is protected work product, as are many
“communications between the party’s attorney and any witness required to provide a
report under Rule 26(a)(2)(B), regardless of the form of the communications . . . .” FED.
R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(B)–(C);

A “party may not, by interrogatories or deposition, discover facts known or opinions held
by an expert who has been retained or specially employed by another party in
anticipation of litigation or to prepare for trial and who is not expected to be called as a
witness at trial” absent certain exceptions. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(D);

“Unless manifest injustice would result, the court must require that the party seeking
discovery . . . pay the expert a reasonable fee for time spent in responding to
discovery . . . .” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(E).
11 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(E).
12 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2).
13 See id.
14 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(B).
15 See 8A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2034
(3d ed. 1998), Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2018).
16 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(A).
17 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(E).
18 See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947) (“We agree, of course, that the
deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment. No longer can
the time-honored cry of ‘fishing expedition’ serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the
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B. The Rationale for the Expert Fee Shifting Rule
The “basic proposition” of the expert fee shifting rule “is relatively
straightforward—a party that takes advantage of the opportunity afforded by
Rule 26(b)(4)(A) to prepare a more forceful cross-examination should pay
the expert’s charges for submitting to this examination.”19 In other words,
while a party is permitted to depose the opposing party’s expert, the deposing
party should be the one who pays the expert’s deposition fees.
While this basic rationale behind expert fee shifting may appear logical,
fee shifting—even when seemingly warranted—is an anomaly within the
American legal system.20 Fees are rarely shifted, let alone shifted
automatically.21 On the rare occasion in which attorneys’ fees are shifted,
the shifting is not automatic, but rather happens only after a detailed fee
application is made. The opposing party has the opportunity to challenge the
application and the court ultimately arrives at a reasonable amount.22 Thus,
the question arises: what warrants the unique and automatic rule for shifting
experts’ fees? The answer comes down to experts’ voluntary involvement
in the legal system and the fact that someone has to pay them; the tradeoff
between mandatory disclosures and the perceived need for depositions; and
the fact that the deposing party controls the deposition by determining the
location, length, etc., and thus the related costs.
First, expert witnesses are themselves anomalies. Most witnesses in
litigation have not willingly injected themselves into the legal process; they
are there, generally, because they have first-hand knowledge of some fact at
issue in a trial. If necessary, they can be subpoenaed and forced to provide
testimony. They are paid a nominal per diem amount for their testimony,
facts underlying his opponent’s case.”); Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The
Historical Background of the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 739 (1998)
(discussing liberalization of discovery rules).
19 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, § 2034; see also Eastman v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 14cv-00703-WQH (WVG), 2016 WL 795881, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 29, 2016).
20 See, e.g., Globe Distributors, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co. (In re Globe Distributors, Inc.),
145 B.R. 728, 733 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1992) (citing Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness
Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 245 (1975)) (noting that a fee shifting statute was “contrary to the general
‘American rule’ that each party to a lawsuit bears its own costs (and fees)”).
21 See id. at 733 (“Where, as here, an exception to the general rule is allowed, such [fee
shifting] should be implemented in a conservative fashion.”).
22 See DiNicola v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union Local 503, No. 6:08-cv-6317-TC, 2013 WL
5781220, at *1–2 (D. Or. Oct. 25, 2013), for an example of the rigorous and detailed
procedures involved in shifting attorney’s fees under a federal statute. See also Matthew D.
Klaiber, Comment, A Uniform Fee-Setting System for Calculating Court-Awarded Attorneys’
Fees: Combining Ex Ante Rates with a Multifactor Lodestar Method and a PerformanceBased Mathematical Model, 66 MD. L. REV. 228, 235 (2006) (noting development of “certain
fee-calculation methodologies aimed at guiding the process of awarding attorneys’ fees[,]”
including “the percentage-of-recovery method, the lodestar method, and the pure factor-based
method”).
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regardless of the hardship or costs imposed on them or their work as a result
of providing such testimony.23 Expert witnesses, though, are retained by one
of the parties. The expert witness serves by choice and, like most people,
chooses not to work for free.
As it turns out, the fact that experts are hired—and not required—to be
part of the litigation process makes all the difference as to why discovery
fees for experts are shifted. Rather than expert discovery being viewed as a
right, like other forms of discovery, it is viewed more as a privilege with
strings attached.24 The party that hires the expert must pay the expert for
time spent forming expert opinions in the case, which includes reviewing
documents, talking to persons with first-hand knowledge, reviewing relevant
literature in the expert’s field, formulating opinions, and drafting a report.
That can be costly, and it is a cost that is paid for solely by the party that
retains the expert.25 Expert discovery of those opinions is thus viewed as
potentially “unfair” because it “let[s] one party have for free what the other
party has paid for.”26 Therefore, historically, courts have restricted discovery
of an adversary’s expert, particularly as to the expert’s opinions, based on
“the fear that one side will benefit unduly from the other’s better
preparation.”27 Rule 26(b)(4)(E) shifting of expert discovery fees represents
an attempt to find a middle ground that avoids this potential unfairness by
allocating “expert expenses between the retaining party and the one seeking
discovery.”28 The result is that discovery of experts’ testimony is allowed,
but the deposing party must pay for it.
Second, unlike lay witnesses, experts have to disclose their opinions.
In theory, such disclosures obviate, or at least drastically reduce, the need for
any, let alone lengthy, deposition testimony. This is because all of the
experts’ opinions, and the bases for such opinions, have already been
disclosed.29 Indeed, when Rule 26 was amended to require disclosure of
23 See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1821(b) (West 2018) (“A witness shall be paid an attendance fee of
$40 per day for each day’s attendance.”).
24 See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, § 2034.
25 See Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc., No. 4:05-CV-0273-HLM, 2007 WL 9712069, at *6
(N.D. Ga. July 24, 2007) (quoting Magee v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 172 F.R.D. 627, 645
(E.D.N.Y. 1997)) (“Rule 26(b)(4)(C)’s mandatory compensation requirement is intended ‘to
avoid the unfairness of requiring one party to provide expensive discovery for another party’s
benefit without reimbursement.’”).
26 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, § 2034.
27 FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 1970 amendment.
28 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, § 2034.
29 See Schmidt v. Solis, 272 F.R.D.1, 2 (D.D.C. 2010); Waters v. City of Chicago, 526
F. Supp. 2d. 899, 900 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (“This Court frequently reminds counsel in cases before
it that an important consequence of the Rule 26(a)(2)(B) and (C) requirement of a
comprehensive report from every opinion witness who is expected to testify is that the
witness’ trial testimony is circumscribed by that report.”); cf. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15,
§ 2034 (“If, as was hoped, these disclosures serve to avoid the need for some experts’
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expert reports, one primary reason cited for the amendment was that it would
and should discourage parties from taking experts’ depositions. The Rule 26
Advisory Committee reasoned that the expert’s report would “eliminate the
need to take a useless deposition in which the expert simply repeats what
[the expert] had said in his report.” By extension, the Advisory Committee
believed that “forc[ing] the party taking the deposition to pay the expert’s
fee” would hopefully “eliminate[e] such depositions because the expert will
have produced a report that clearly indicates the opinions the expert holds
and will testify about at trial.”30 Put differently, the deposing party could
have chosen a less expensive discovery method, such as written
interrogatories, but it did not.31 Thus, the need for an expert deposition is
viewed with some skepticism, such that a party that insists on deposing the
opposing expert, despite having a “complete and accurate” report, must pay
for that luxury.
Finally, the third rationale is that the deposing party controls not only
whether the expert is deposed, but also the length and location of the
deposition. So, not only is the deposing party viewed as the beneficiary of
the deposition, but it is also viewed as the party that controls the costs
associated with the deposition. Put simply, if the deposing party elects to
take an eight-hour deposition at a location that is remote for the expert, it
should have to incur all related costs—not the party that retained the expert.

depositions, or at least to shorten the depositions, that may mean that there will be fewer
occasions for payment of expert fees pursuant to Rule 26(b)(4)(C).”). For a thorough history
of the expert discovery rule from its inception to its most recent amendments in 2010, see
generally Brett Lawrence, Note, What Do I Have to Do to Get Paid Around Here?: Rule
26(b)(4)(E)(i) and the Qualms Regarding Expert Deposition Preparation Time, 74 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 2231 (2017).
30 FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment.
[P]aragraph (4)(A) is revised to provide that experts who are expected to
be witnesses will be subject to deposition prior to trial, conforming the
norm stated in the rule to the actual practice followed in most courts, in
which depositions of experts have become standard. Concerns regarding
the expense of such depositions should be mitigated by the fact that the
expert’s fees for the deposition will ordinarily be borne by the party
taking the deposition. The requirement under subdivision (a)(2)(B) of a
complete and detailed report of the expected testimony of certain forensic
experts may, moreover, eliminate the need for some such depositions or
at least reduce the length of the depositions. Accordingly, the deposition
of an expert required by subdivision (a)(2)(B) to provide a written report
may be taken only after the report has been served.
Id.
31 Lancaster v. Lord, No. 90 Civ. 5843 (RLC), 1993 WL 97258, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
31, 1993) (“Since the defendants chose to depose [the opposing expert] rather than to seek
discovery through written interrogatories, Rule 26(b)(4)(C) applies, and plaintiff is entitled to
reimbursement for [the expert’s] time spent preparing for and attending the deposition[.]”
(citation omitted)).
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C. The Mechanics of the Expert Fee Shifting Rule
The expert fee shifting rule is seemingly straightforward. It provides,
in pertinent part, that “[u]nless manifest injustice would result . . . the court
must require that the party seeking discovery . . . pay [the adverse party’s]
expert a reasonable fee for time spent in responding to discovery under [this
subdivision] . . . .”32 Thus, the rule, at its clearest and most basic level,
provides that the party who seeks expert discovery must pay for it. It is wellsettled that deposition time is compensable under Rule 26(b)(4)(E) as “time
spent in responding to discovery.”33 Accordingly, the rule does not by its
express terms include trial testimony, responding to a Daubert motion, or
any non-discovery matter.34 Further, the rule covers discovery relating to all
types of experts, whether the expert is one that is specifically retained for
litigation or not.35 Thus, fees are shifted even for experts that are the
adversary’s employees or for experts that have opinions due to their pre-suit
involvement in the subject of the litigation, such as in treating physicians.36
And finally, because the rule “provides an independent basis for recovery of
expert fees as part of discovery,” it “applies to both parties, not just to the
prevailing party.”37
For expert discovery covered by the rule, the fee-shifting provision
contains two operative parts: (1) the party seeking discovery must “pay the
expert a reasonable fee,” and (2) the fee payment is only “for time spent in
responding to discovery.” While this language seems straightforward at first
blush, the devil (and litigation) is in the details. Various and recurring
questions arise in the context of fee shifting. What is “time spent responding
to discovery?” The usual way in which experts respond to discovery is by
providing deposition testimony. Still, what time relating to depositions is
covered? While the actual time spent in being deposed is clearly

32 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(E). Prior to the 2010 amendment to Rule 26, the expert fee
shifting rule was located at 26(b)(4)(C). Thus, in cases that predate that amendment, a
reference to Rule 26(b)(4)(C) is a reference to the fee shifting rule now housed at 26(b)(4)(E).
See Lawrence, supra note 29, at 2253 (“[F]ormer subdivision (b)(4)(C) became (b)(4)(E).”).
33 Fisher v. Accor Hotels, Inc., No. Civ.A. 02-CV-8576, 2004 WL 73727, at *1 (E.D. Pa.
Jan. 12, 2004) (citation omitted).
34 See Nester v. Textron, Inc., No. 1:13-CV-920 RP, 2016 WL 6537991, at *3 (W.D.
Tex. Nov. 3, 2016).
35 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(E).
36 See Maxwell S. Kennerly, Treating Physicians & Non-Retained Expert Witnesses:
What Do Parties Have to Disclose Before Trial?, LITIG. & TRIAL (Mar. 7, 2017)
https://www.litigationandtrial.com/2017/03/articles/attorney/ non-retained-expert-witnesses
(“‘Non-retained’ expert witnesses are more common in federal court than many people
realize: think of the doctors who treated an injured plaintiff, the government employees who
investigated an accident, the engineers who worked on a defective product, or the competing
inventors of a design in a patent infringement case.”).
37 La. Power & Light Co. v. Kellstrom, 50 F.3d 319, 332–33 (5th Cir. 1995).
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compensable, what about the time peripheral to a deposition, such as travel
time? What about the time that an expert spends preparing (e.g., reviewing
the file) for the deposition?
Similarly, what constitutes a “reasonable fee?” Is a flat-fee rate of
$3000 for a deposition that lasts only two hours “reasonable?” Is an hourly
rate of $500 for deposition testimony “reasonable?” What if that same expert
only charged $200 an hour for other work in the case? In addition,
interpretative problems arise not only from what the rule says, but from what
the rule does not say. The rule fails to state when fees are due or who bears
the burden of proving the reasonableness of fees. Further, the rule does not
address the procedures when disagreements about fees arise—a gap made all
the worse by the rule’s blanket pronouncement that fees must be paid unless
“manifest injustice” would result. These problems associated with the rule
are addressed in Part III, and the overall implications associated with those
problems are discussed in Part IV.
III. PROBLEMS WITH THE FEE SHIFTING RULE
The problems with the expert fee-shifting rule arise from not only what
it does say, but also from what it does not say. First and foremost, the rule
is plagued by interpretive issues regarding its scope that arise from
ambiguities within its four corners; key operational terms are left vague and
undefined. Second, the rule makes no provisions for the logistical issues that
routinely arise under it. It leaves litigants and courts alike to make educated
guesses about, for example, when payments are due. Finally, even for
matters in which it is clear, the rule strikes the wrong balance by shifting fees
without justification. The result is that the deposing party ends up paying
experts’ fees that it did not request, does not control, and gains no benefits
from.
A. Interpretative Problems: What Constitutes “Reasonable Fees”
for “Time Spent Responding to Discovery”
While the rule’s “basic proposition is relatively straightforward,” the
implementation is not.38 Instead, “potential difficulties and unfairness lurk
below the surface.”39 Most notably, the two main prongs of the rule—that
the deposing party must “pay the expert a reasonable fee” and that fee must
pay for “time spent in responding to discovery”—raise numerous
interpretative questions.
For example, is an expert’s flat fee that charges the opposing party for
setting aside a full day “reasonable” regardless of the length of the
38
39

WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, § 2034.
Id.

SHELTON (DO NOT DELETE)

486

2/11/2019 12:14 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:475

deposition? Is an expert’s fee “reasonable” if the expert charges a higher
hourly rate for his deposition than he did for the time spent preparing his
report? Is time that an expert spends travelling to and from the deposition
part of “time spent in responding to discovery,” such that the deposing party
must pay the expert’s fees for that time? What about the time an expert
spends preparing for her deposition—must the opposing party pay for such
time as part of “time spent responding to discovery?”
In addition, some interpretative problems arise from what the rule fails
to address. Most notably absent from the four corners of the rule is any
mention of when fees are due and what process should be employed when
disputes arise over fees. And despite an endless stream of district court
litigation, these interpretative problems continue to mire the fee-shifting rule.
Ambiguities in a rule frequently are resolved at the appellate court level.
Once the appellate courts conclusively interpret a rule, its meaning becomes
settled, there is uniformity, and there is no need (or ability) for district courts
to continue to re-examine the issue. That has not, however, been the case for
the expert fee shifting rule.40 Rather, the same questions of law have been
repeatedly litigated in federal courtrooms across the country.41 What makes
this rule different, such that the typical process for resolving its meaning has
not happened despite its promulgation over twenty-five years ago?
The problem lies in the fact that almost all litigation over the rule occurs
at the district court level and never reaches the appellate courts.42 It is wellknown that “the [r]ule lacks discussion at the federal appellate level.”43 The
dearth of appellate discussion stems from two dynamics. First, most cases
settle rather than go trial and thus there is no appeal. Second, even for those
cases for which there is an appeal, the issue of which fees should have shifted
would not be an issue raised on appeal because it is not an outcomedeterminative issue. So while understandable, the lack of authority at the
appellate level means the rule “cannot be applied consistently in a region, let

40

Id. (“The courts have deplored the paucity of authority on the subject . . . .”) (footnote
omitted).
41 The absence of appellate authority, and thus consistency, has been noted by district
courts. See, e.g., Veasey v. Abbott, No. 2:13-CV-193, 2017 WL 1092307, at *1 (S.D. Tex.
Mar. 23, 2017) (“The Fifth Circuit has not addressed whether Rule 26(b)(4)(E) covers fees
for time spent preparing for a deposition. Other courts are split on whether the rule allows for
such compensation with a slim majority allowing recovery as long as the fees are reasonable.”
(citing Borel v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 265 F.R.D. 275, 277 (E.D. La. 2010))).
42 Namely, it is highly unusual for a party to raise an issue regarding expert fees on
appeal. Such an issue surely would not warrant an interlocutory appeal; not only because it
is not likely to irreparably alter the status quo if it goes to final judgment, but also because the
likelihood of success is low given the deferential abuse of discretion standard. And for those
few cases that do not settle and go to final judgment, at that point there are more consequential
issues to appeal.
43 Lawrence, supra note 29, at 2277.
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alone across the United States.”44
1. Disputes Regarding What Constitutes “Time Spent
Responding to Discovery”
The largest interpretative problem from the fee shifting rule arises from
the phrase “time responding to discovery.” Courts must decide “what is
encompassed by the phrase,” ranging from “expert fees for the actual
deposition only, or fees for deposition preparation and other expenses,
including travel time and expense.”45 Not surprisingly, there is no consensus
among courts or litigants as to what this cryptic phrase entails. Further, the
Advisory Committee Note “provides only the most limited guidance.”46 It
“states, without further elaboration, that ‘the expert’s fees for the deposition
will ordinarily be borne by the party taking the deposition.’”47 So although
it is clear that an expert’s fees for time spent in a deposition are covered, it
is unclear and disputed whether other fees related to a deposition, such as
preparation for the deposition and travel to the deposition, must be paid by
the deposing party. Courts are split, such that “[t]here has . . . ‘been
considerable disagreement among courts regarding what activities qualify as
“time spent in responding to discovery.”‘“48
Some courts have observed that “[t]he Advisory Committee Note’s use
of the phrase ‘for the deposition’ suggests that the shifting of expert fees is
limited to the fees attributable to the deposition itself.”49 As one court
correctly conceded, however, “the Advisory Committee Note ‘could be
construed differently,’ and is not dispositive.”50 And, indeed, many courts
do construe that phrase differently. The various interpretations of this phrase
are discussed below with regard to two primary areas of dispute: whether
depositions preparation time is covered, and whether time spent traveling to
and from a deposition is covered.51
44

Id. (footnote omitted).
Durkin v. Paccar, Inc., No. 10-2013 (JHR/AMD), 2012 WL 12887769, at *3 (D.N.J.
Dec. 28, 2012).
46 Eastman v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 14-cv-00703-WQH (WVG), 2016 WL 795881, at *5
n.1 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 29, 2016).
47 Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment).
48 Id. at *4 (quoting Fulks v. Allstate Prop. & Cas., Ins. Co., No. 3:14-cv-29473, 2016
WL 447628, at *2 (S.D. W. Va. Feb. 4, 2016)).
49 Rock River Commc’ns, Inc. v. Universal Music Grp., 276 F.R.D. 633, 635 (C.D. Cal.
2011).
50 Allstate Ins. Co., 2016 WL 795881, at *5 n.1 (citation omitted).
51 Other areas of dispute arise, but with less frequency and fewer consequences. For
example, courts have addressed whether “time spent reviewing a deposition [transcript] falls
within the scope of Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i).” Nester v. Textron, Inc., No. 1:13-CV-920 RP, 2016
WL 6537991, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 3, 2016) (“However, like deposition preparation time,
the Court finds that although the time an expert spends reviewing his or her deposition is
45
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Whether Fees for Time Spent Preparing for the
Deposition Are Shifted

Whether preparation time is included under the fee shifting rule has
divided the federal courts.52 The inquiry boils down to how courts interpret
the phrase “time spent responding to discovery.” At one extreme, some
courts hold that preparation time is always covered: “Fees awarded under
this rule include time spent in preparing for the deposition, in traveling to the
deposition, and in the deposition.”53 At the other end of the spectrum, some
courts hold that absent extenuating circumstances, an expert’s time outside
of the deposition room is not covered: “[I]n the absence of extenuating
circumstances, the deposing party is not required to compensate the expert
for his or her preparation time.”54 These courts reason, among other things,
that “the language of the rule is too vague to directly dispose of the issue at
hand.”55 Other courts have attempted to carve out middle grounds, such as
including preparation time in general, but not time spent consulting with the
retaining party’s counsel.56
Without a clear standard in the rule itself, courts tend to resort to policy
rationales in support of their interpretations—e.g., “even in exceptional,
complex, or unusual circumstances expert deposition preparation and expert

compensable, it should be limited to the extent it is unreasonable.” (citation omitted)).
Interpretation issues arise because, while a deposing party may reasonably expect that an
expert will read her deposition for “obvious errors or typos,” an expert may bill for time spent
reviewing her deposition when her review is, in essence, to help prepare for cross-examination
at trial. Id. Thus, review time is another category of fees that warrants clarification. See id.
52 See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co., 2016 WL 795881, at *1.
53 Auto. Rentals, Inc. v. Keith Huber, Inc., No. 1:10CV385-LG-RHW, 2012 WL
12854841, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 10, 2012). This is, in fact, the most common approach. See,
e.g., Nester, 2016 WL 6537991, at *3 (citing Halasa v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., 609 F.3d 844
(7th Cir. 2012)); Ushijima v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. A-12-CV-318-LY, 2015 WL
11251558, at *6 (W.D. Tex. July 30, 2015) (ordering reimbursement of one hour of
preparation time for every hour spent in deposition); Se–Kure Controls, Inc. v. Vanguard
Prods. Grp., Inc., 873 F. Supp. 2d 939, 956 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (“In general, courts in this District
have concluded that, under Rule 26(b)(4)(E), it is reasonable for a party to recover expert
witness fees from the opposing party for the time an expert spent both preparing for and
attending a deposition conducted by the opposing party.”); Tavarez–Guerrero v. ToledoDávila, 271 F.R.D. 426, 428 (D.P.R. 2010) (“Courts have generally found that the party taking
the deposition is required by Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i) to pay for preparation time.”)).
54 Allstate Ins. Co., 2016 WL 795881, at *1 (“The second question is whether Allstate,
as the party seeking discovery, is required to compensate the experts not only for their
testimony—which Allstate has agreed to do—but also for their time spent preparing for the
depositions.” (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(E)(i) (“Unless manifest injustice would result,
the court must require that the party seeking discovery pay the expert a reasonable fee for
time spent in responding to discovery under Rule 26(b)(4)(A) or (D).”))).
55 Id. at *5 (“[The rule] does not specifically address whether fees can be recovered for
time spent preparing for a deposition . . . .”).
56 See Allstate Ins. Co., 2016 WL 795881, at *4.
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trial preparation are inextricably intertwined.”57 Some courts hold that an
expert’s preparation time benefits the deposing party because “preparation is
often necessary to enable the witness to be fully responsive during the
deposition, and that preparation ‘facilitates the deposition process by
avoiding repeated interruptions to enable the witness to refresh his
recollection by consulting.’”58 Other courts reach the opposite policy
conclusion and hold that the beneficiary of an expert’s preparation is the
party that hired him, even noting that the deposing attorney might prefer the
expert be unprepared: “There are doubtless some attorneys who will send an
expert into a deposition unprepared, but there are surely very few inquiring
attorneys who complain.”59 Because the rule does not provide clarity, and
courts do not agree, widespread variation exists surrounding whether and
when preparation time is covered.60
In light of the myriad interpretations, one court attempted to summarize
the various positions taken by courts, positing four approaches:
As relevant here, courts within the Ninth Circuit and beyond have
divided on the question of whether Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i) requires
the inquiring party to reimburse the expert for his or her
preparation time. A number of courts have held that reasonable
preparation time is reimbursable.61 Other courts have reached the
same conclusion on reimbursement for preparation time but have
specifically excluded any time that the expert spends in
consultation with the retaining party’s attorney.62 Other courts
57

Durkin v. Paccar, Inc., No. 10-2013 (JHR/AMD), 2012 WL 12887769, at *4 (D.N.J.
Dec. 28, 2012), aff’d sub nom., Durkin v. Wabash Nat’l, No. 10-2013, 2013 WL 5466930
(D.N.J. Sept. 30, 2013).
58 Script Sec. Sols., LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 2:15-CV-1030-WCB, 2016 WL
6649721, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 10, 2016) (citations omitted).
59 Allstate Ins. Co., 2016 WL 795881, at *5.
60 The variation exists not only across the courts of appeals, but also among the district
courts in a given circuit. See, e.g., id. at *4 (“There is no Ninth Circuit authority on point and
no consensus among district courts within this circuit.”).
61 Id. (first citing United States ex rel. Liotine v. CDW–Gov’t, Inc., No. 3:05-cv-33DRH-DGW, 2012 WL 1252982, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 13, 2012); then citing Borel v. Chevron
U.S.A. Inc., 265 F.R.D. 275, 277 (E.D. La. 2010); then citing Packer v. SN Servicing Corp.,
243 F.R.D. 39, 42 (D. Conn. 2007); then citing Lent v. Fashion Mall Partners, L.P., 223 F.R.D.
317, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); then citing Mannarino v. United States, 218 F.R.D. 372, 376
(E.D.N.Y. 2003); then citing Profile Prods., LLC v. Soil Mgmt. Techs., Inc., 155 F. Supp. 2d.
880, 886 (N.D. Ill. 2001); and then citing Collins v. Vill. of Woodridge, 197 F.R.D. 354, 355
(N.D. Ill. 1999)).
62 Id. (first citing Ndubizu v. Drexel Univ., No. 07-3068, 2011 WL 6046816, at *3 (E.D.
Pa. Nov. 16, 2011); then citing All Cities Realty, Inc. v. CF Real Estate Loans, Inc., No. SA
CV 05-615 AHS (MLGx), 2008 WL 10594412, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2008); then citing
Waters v. City of Chicago, 526 F. Supp. 2d. 899, 901 (N.D. Ill. 2007); then citing Mock v.
Johnson, 218 F.R.D. 680, 683 (D. Haw. 2003); then citing Magee v. Paul Revere Life Ins.
Co., 172 F.R.D. 627, 647 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); and then citing Hose v. Chi. & N.W. Transp. Co.,
154 F.R.D. 222, 228 (S.D. Iowa 1994)); see, e.g., All Cities Realty, Inc., 2008 WL 10594412,
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(and this appears to be a minority view) have held that preparation
time is not “time spent in responding to discovery” reimbursable
under Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i).63 A final line of decisions holds that
preparation time is only reimbursable in complex cases, or in
extenuating circumstances.64
Not only do different courts interpret the rule differently, whether
preparation time is covered is sufficiently ambiguous that at least one judge
has reversed his position, initially taking a “middle ground” approach and
later adopting a per se rule:
In the Fago case, I attempted to find a middle ground for the
fee provision in Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(C)(i) to deal with the
ambiguities raised in preparing for deposition, where it may be
unclear whether an expert is “responding to discovery” or engaging
in trial preparation, the latter of which should not be charged to the
deposing party. [A]fter careful consideration, I have come to the
conclusion that my prior position was misguided. Instead, I believe
that reasonable fees for the time spent by an expert for a deposition
should always be paid by the party taking the deposition.65
In addition, some courts ignore this issue entirely and do not address whether

at *6 (“[T]he Court must avoid charging the opponent for the deposing party’s ordinary trial
preparation . . . [and it] will not reimburse fees for the experts’ time spent in conference with
counsel prior to the depositions.”).
63 Allstate Ins. Co., 2016 WL 795881, at *4 (citing Rock River Commc’ns, Inc. v.
Universal Music Grp., 276 F.R.D. 633, 637 (C.D. Cal. 2011)).
64 Id. (first citing Fiber Optic Designs, Inc. v. New Eng. Pottery, LLC, 262 F.R.D. 586,
592 (D. Colo. 2009); then citing 3M Co. v. Kanbar, No. C06-01225 JW (HRL), 2007 WL
2972921, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2007); then citing M. T. McBrian, Inc. v. Liebert Corp.,
173 F.R.D. 491, 493 (N.D. Ill. 1997); then citing S.A. Healy Co. v. Milwaukee Metro.
Sewerage Dist., 154 F.R.D. 212, 214 (E.D. Wis. 1994); and then citing Rhee v. Witco Chem.
Corp., 126 F.R.D. 45, 47 (N.D. Ill. 1989)).
The Court therefore holds that fee-shifting for expert preparation is
the exception, not the rule, and is only required in extenuating
circumstances. The Court must next decide whether such circumstances
are present in this case. In so doing, the Court does not write on a blank
slate, but is guided by other courts that have similarly construed Rule
26(b)(4)(E)(i). The Rhee court, for instance, noted that reimbursement of
expert preparation time may be appropriate “in a complex case where the
expert’s deposition has been repeatedly postponed over long periods of
time by the seeking party causing the expert to repeatedly review
voluminous documents.” In S.A. Healy, the court similarly recognized an
“exception to the general rule [against reimbursement] in complex cases
where there has been a considerable lapse of time between an expert’s
work on a case and the date of his actual deposition.” Another court
allowed reimbursement for expert preparation fees where the case was
‘extremely complex’ and required the expert to review “voluminous
documents.”
Id. at *6.
65 Schmidt v. Solis, 272 F.R.D. 1, 1 (D.D.C. 2010).
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deposition preparation time is included in Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i).66 Instead,
these courts assume, without providing any “rationalization,” that
preparation time is covered.67
Finally, the rule’s ambiguity regarding fee shifting for preparation time
also results in variation among experts. Some experts include this time in
their invoices, while others do not.68 This, too, creates a lack of uniformity,
insofar as experts, without any guidance from the rule, will err on different
sides—some will take the lack of clarity as an opportunity to charge
opposing counsel for such expenses, whereas others will note the express
lack of coverage as a basis not to include such fees.
Because neither the plain language of the rule nor its advisory notes
shed sufficient light on what is meant by “time spent preparing for the
deposition,” a few courts have resorted to issuing standing orders to clear up
ambiguities in the rule.69 For example, in a multidistrict litigation case, the
court issued a two-page order with eleven protocols regarding the rule.70 The
order contains a paragraph defining what is included as “time spent
responding to discovery”:
Pursuant to Rule 26(b)(4)(E), the Court shall require the
party or parties seeking to depose an expert witness to pay the
expert a reasonable fee for time spent by the expert in connection
with his/her participation in the deposition. This shall include
time spent preparing for the deposition (not including time spent
conferring with counsel), actual time spent in the deposition, and
travel time to and from the place where the deposition is
conducted.71
While room exists for disagreement regarding the interpretation of the rule
reflected in the standing order, the existence of a standing order at least
serves to alleviate the interpretative problems and disputes in that particular
court.

66

Lawrence, supra note 29, at 2263.
Id.
68 The author’s spouse has served as an expert in more than 100 cases in state and federal
courts for approximately twenty years and has never billed the opposing party for time spent
preparing for a deposition. When asked about his practice, he explained that an expert already
has done the work and issued a report, and thus should already have done the “preparation”
needed for a deposition. To the extent preparation time is needed, it likely is for the benefit
of the party that engaged the expert, not the party taking the deposition.
69 See, e.g., DEPOSITION PROTOCOL REGARDING TENDER & PAYMENT OF EXPERT
WITNESSES IN CVLO MDL 875 CASES (2012), https://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/
MDL/MDL875/15expert%20deposition%20protocol.pdf [hereinafter MDL PROTOCOL].
70 While the protocol represents a single court’s response to the lack of clarity and
guidance in the rule, the fact that such a protocol was deemed necessary—and that eleven
different protocols all tied to Rule 26(b)(4)(E) were included—is telling and instructive.
71 MDL PROTOCOL, supra note 69, ¶ 2.
67
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In the vast majority of cases, there is no case precedent nor a standing
order that clarifies what is included in “time spent responding to discovery.”
As a result, litigants and courts frequently resort to policy considerations in
their interpretations.72 The considerations range from who controls the
experts’ particular fees and for whose benefit such fees are truly incurred,73
to the difficulty of gauging what preparation time is reasonable.74 Thus,
courts spend considerable time analyzing the pros and cons of including
preparation time as part of “time spent responding to discovery.” Not
surprisingly, courts weigh the competing policies differently, resulting in
varied interpretations. The result is not only inconsistency among
interpretations, but also the litigation costs of having various courts decide
this issue anew because there is no settled law.
ii.

Whether Fees and Expenses for Traveling to and
from the Deposition Are Shifted

Like deposition preparation time, no consistency exists regarding
whether the deposing party must pay for time and expenses spent traveling
to and from the deposition. Just as it is unresolved whether preparation time
is “time spent responding to discovery,” it also is unsettled whether time and
expenses spent traveling to and from a deposition fall within that language.
While many courts hold that time and expenses spent traveling is covered,75
72 See, e.g., Durkin v. Paccar, Inc., No. 10-2013 (JHR/AMD), 2012 WL 12887769, at *1
(D.N.J. Dec. 28, 2012), aff’d sub nom., Durkin v. Wabash Nat’l, No. 10-2013, 2013 WL
5466930 (D.N.J. Sept. 30, 2013) (“Defendant has not cited any binding authority on the
matter, but relies upon the policy behind Rule 26(b)(4) and asserts that the majority of the
courts to have addressed this question permit reimbursement.” (citations omitted)).
73 See, e.g., Rock River Commc’ns, Inc. v. Universal Music Grp., 276 F.R.D. 633, 636
(C.D. Cal. 2011) (“[A]n expert’s deposition preparation may encompass a variety of tasks that
contribute little or nothing to the efficiency of the deposition, are largely unrelated to the
deposition, or are undertaken for an entirely partisan purpose . . . .”).
74 See generally Eastman v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 14-cv-00703-WQH (WVG), 2016 WL
795881, at *5–6 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 29, 2016) (describing various concerns with holding that fees
should be shifted for time spent preparing for a deposition).
75 See, e.g., Nnodimele v. City of New York, No. 13-CV-3461 (ARR), 2015 WL
4461008, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July 21, 2015) (“Ordinarily, hours that an expert spends on
preparation and travel in connection with the expert’s deposition are compensable under Rule
26(b)(4)(E).”); Reit v. Post Props., Inc., No. 09 Civ. 5455(RMB)(KNF), 2010 WL 4537044,
at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2010) (“‘The district courts in the Second Circuit have consistently
held that time spent by an expert preparing for a deposition is compensable under Rule
26(b)(4)(C),’ and that ‘time spent traveling to and from the deposition, and the expenses
incurred during travel, so long as they are reasonable, are compensable under Rule
26(b)(4)(C).’” (quoting New York v. Solvent Chem. Co., 210 F.R.D. 462, 471–72 (W.D.N.Y.
2002))); EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 5481 LBS AJP, 1999 WL 32909, at
*3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 1999) (“The EEOC therefore implicitly concedes that properly
documented and reasonable travel expenses are reimbursable, and at least on the facts of this
case, the Court agrees.” (citing Ohuche v. British Airways, No. 97 Civ. 1853 (JSM) RLE,
1998 WL 240481, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 11, 1998) (granting recovery of expert’s travel
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others hold that it is not contemplated by the rule.76
Without clear language in the rule, policy considerations—often
inconsistent—abound. These policy considerations are weighed anew, and
differently, by each trial court. Some courts that interpret the rule as not
encompassing travel fees and expenses note the potential for the retaining
party to impose increased costs on the deposing party by hiring an expert in
a remote location.77 Although recognizing that a party “should be free to
select the expert of his choice[,]” the opposing party “should not be forced
to pay the increased costs associated with [a party’s] decision to engage an
expert from another part of the country.”78 Other courts appear indifferent
to the potential for one party to impose excessive costs on the opposing party,
and do not take into account the reason for the retaining party’s choice of the
remote expert.79

expenses))); Bonner v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 96CIV.4762(KMW)(HBP), 1997 WL 802894,
at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 31, 1997) (“[T]he weight of authority appears to hold that Rule
26(b)(4)(C) permits recovery of fees for an expert’s travel time . . . in connection with a
deposition, along with the expert’s out-of-pocket expenses.”); Harbor Software, Inc. v.
Applied Sys., Inc., No. 92 Civ. 8097(HB), 1997 WL 187350, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 1997)
(granting recovery of expert’s travel expenses); Magee v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 172
F.R.D. 627, 646 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (“[T]wo issues remain, namely whether [the expert] is
entitled to compensation for travel time and for time spent preparing for the deposition. The
short answers are yes and yes. Travel time has been held compensable.”); DeFelice v. Am.
Int’l Life Assurance Co. of N.Y., No. 94Civ.8165(AGS)(RLE), 1995 WL 753892, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 1995) (granting recovery for expert’s travel expenses); In re “Agent
Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 105 F.R.D. 577, 582 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
76 Bonner, 1997 WL 802894, at *1 (“Although there are conflicting decisions, the weight
of authority appears to hold that Rule 26(b)(4)(C) permits recovery of fees for an expert’s
travel time and preparation time in connection with a deposition, along with the expert’s outof-pocket expenses.” (first citing Magee, 172 F.R.D. at 646; then citing McHale v. Westcott,
893 F. Supp. 143, 151 (N.D.N.Y. 1995); then citing David Tunick, Inc. v. Kornfeld, 151
F.R.D. 534, 536–37 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); then citing “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 105
F.R.D. at 582; and then citing Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Hartz Mountain Indus., 553 F. Supp.
45, 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)).
77 Clearly such gamesmanship would not be the sole reason—or even a reason—that a
party selects a particular expert. The retaining party’s lack of regard for the fees and expenses
associated with the expert’s location does nonetheless impose increased expenses on the
opposing party, and the opposing party neither controls those increased expenses nor benefits
from them.
78 Durkin v. Paccar, Inc., No. 10-2013 (JHR/AMD), 2012 WL 12887769, at *4 (D.N.J.
Dec. 28, 2012), aff’d sub nom., Durkin v. Wabash Nat’l, No. 10-2013, 2013 WL 5466930
(D.N.J. Sept. 30, 2013) (quoting Lent v. Fashion Mall Partners, L.P., 223 F.R.D. 317, 318
(S.D.N.Y. 2004)).
79 See, e.g., Rock River Commc’ns, Inc. v. Universal Music Grp., 276 F.R.D. 633, 637
(C.D. Cal. 2011) (focusing on the deposing party’s ability to “control the amount of time the
expert spends traveling by selecting a location for an expert’s deposition that minimizes an
expert’s travel time, potentially including opting to take the deposition by telephone or video
conference[,]” without acknowledging the travel expenses that would be imposed on the
deposing party to take a remote deposition).
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Closely related to the question of compensation for travel time is the
interpretive question of whether travel expenses (cost of a hotel, airfare, etc.)
are included in the fee shifting. Most courts treat the question as merely an
extension of the travel time.80 Such courts reason that because “travel time
[is] time spent ‘responding’ to discovery[,]” so too must the related
“expenses incurred during travel” be deemed as “time spent responding to
discovery.”81 Other courts rationalize shifting expert travel expenses on
grounds that lay witnesses may be compensated for “their travel expenses
post-trial as part of ‘costs.’”82
Some courts, however, have focused on the plain words of the rule,
such as payment for “time spent in responding to discovery[,]” and have
concluded that expenses are not compensable. For example, in rejecting the
claim to shift deposition travel expenses to the opposing party, one court
held:
Like with review time, neither party directly addresses
whether the costs of travel to and from a deposition, such as the

80 See, e.g., Durkin, 2012 WL 12887769, at *4 (equating travel time and expenses and
allowing recovery, despite not permitting recovery for deposition preparation time); Ndubizu
v. Drexel Univ., No. 07-3068, 2011 WL 6046816, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 16, 2011) (“Travel
expenses are also reimbursable under Rule 26(b)(4)(E).” (citing Feliciano v. Cty. of Suffolk,
246 F.R.D. 134, 137 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (“[A] number of courts in the Second Circuit have held
that [Rule 26(b)(4)(E)] ‘permits recovery of fees for an expert’s travel time along with the
expert’s out-of-pocket expenses.’”))); Dwyer v. Deutsche Lufthansa, AG, No. CV 043184(TCP)(AKT), 2007 WL 526606, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2007) (“A number of courts
in the Second Circuit have held that Rule 26(b)(4)(C) ‘permits recovery of fees for an expert’s
travel time along with the expert’s out-of-pocket expenses.’” (quoting Bonner, 1997 WL
802894, at *1)).
81 Handi-Craft Co. v. Action Trading, S.A., No. 4:02 CV 1731 LMB, 2003 WL
26098543, at *16 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 25, 2003).
82 See, e.g., Hillmann v. City of Chicago, No. 04 C 6671, 2017 WL 3521098, at *10
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 16, 2017) (“The Court finds Plaintiff’s arguments for denying [the expert’s]
travel expenses unpersuasive. Section 1920 authorizes awarding costs for ‘[f]ees and
disbursements for . . . witnesses.’” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1920(3))). “‘The witness fee
specified in § 1920(3) is defined in 28 U.S.C. § 1821,’ which provides that witnesses who
travel to testify at trial or sit for a deposition must be paid an ‘attendance fee’ of $40 per day
and must be reimbursed for their travel and related expenses.” Id. (quoting Crawford Fitting
Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 440 (1987)); see 28 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1), (b)–(c)(1),
(c)(3)–(d)(1) (2018). “Collectively, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1821 and 1920(3) authorize the award of
costs to reimburse witnesses for their reasonable travel and lodging expenses.” Hillmann,
2017 WL 3521098, at *10 (quoting Majeske v. City of Chicago, 218 F.3d 816, 825–26 (7th
Cir. 2000). “Accordingly, courts in this District have routinely awarded costs for expert
witnesses’ travel expenses.” Id. (citing Nilssen v. Osram Sylvania, Inc., No. 01 C 3585, 2007
WL 25771, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 23, 2007) (“awarding expenses for expert witness to travel to
testify at trial even though trial was belatedly rescheduled”)); Vardon Golf Co. v. Karsten
Mfg. Corp., No. 99 C 2785, 2003 WL 1720066, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2003) (“awarding
costs for expert witness’s travel expenses”)). This logic, however, is limited by the fact that
“costs” are only awarded to the prevailing party, and only after a judgment. See infra Part
II.C.
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cost of a plane ticket or hotel room, fall within the scope of Rule
26(b)(4)(E)(i). However, the rule only requires that a deposing
party pay for an expert’s time, not other costs or expenses. Thus,
the Court will exclude such costs from its award of any expert’s
fees pursuant to Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i).83
There is no reason that a rule of procedure, which should facilitate civil
litigation, instead consumes so much time and so many resources on the part
of litigants and courts, particularly for a recurring issue like travel time and
expenses. First, federal rules exist so that there is uniformity. That
uniformity gives parties notice of what is covered by the rule, and avoids the
costs and uncertainty that arise when no clarity exists, and thus, parties can
and do reasonably dispute what is covered. A federal rule that fails to
provide for such clarity results in excessive time and money spent litigating
its meaning. Second, even when a rule is clear—for example, assume that
the rule unambiguously provided that reasonable travel fees and expenses
must be paid by the opposing party—one must still question if analyzing a
hotel’s rate in a given market is a good use of judicial resources.84
This variation regarding whether fees should shift for an expert’s travel
time, like similar variation regarding preparation time, results in
inconsistency among courts. Depending on where the case is pending, such
fees may or may not be shifted. The fact that courts can and do reach
diametrically opposed positions despite interpreting identical language in the
rule is troubling in a federal court system premised on uniformity. It is also
costly, both in terms of money and time. There is no reason in a federal
system to have nearly identical issues being litigated in successive courts
over and over again.
2. Disputes Regarding What Constitutes “Reasonable Fees”
For fees that are deemed included in “time spent responding to
discovery[,]” the dispute quickly shifts as to what amount of fees are
“reasonable.” The rule does not provide any definitions, presumptions,
factors, or guidelines as to what constitutes “reasonable fees.” Individual
courts, rather, are left to develop their own tests, with many lamenting the
lack of guidance.85 Not surprisingly, wide variation exists across
83 Nester v. Textron, Inc., No. 1:13-CV-920 RP, 2016 WL 6537991, at *4 (W.D. Tex.
Nov. 3, 2016) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(E)(i)).
84 See EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 5481 LBS AJP, 1999 WL 32909,
at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 1999) (“J & H’s reply papers cured the specificity and documentation
problem of which the EEOC complains. However, the Court finds the $970 for 2 nights in a
hotel for Dr. Maister to be excessive—despite the high cost of New York hotel rooms—and
reduces that amount to $400 (i.e., a $570 reduction). In all other respects, the Court rejects
the EEOC’s objections to J & H’s experts’ travel expenses.”).
85 See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, § 2034.
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jurisdictions, and good faith disputes among attorneys abound as to what
constitutes “reasonable fees.”86 These disputes tend to fall into three
categories: (1) the “reasonableness” of the expert’s billed hourly rate and
expenses; (2) the reasonableness of a “flat fee” rate; and (3) the
“reasonableness” of the number of hours charged by the expert.
i.

Reasonableness of Experts’ Billed Hourly Rate and
Expenses

First, unnecessary disputes arise regarding the “reasonableness” of
experts’ hourly rates. Because each expert and their work is different, there
obviously will be variation in what constitutes a “reasonable fee.” But the
rule provides no guidance to courts about what to consider when determining
what is reasonable, whether through definitions, presumptions, or factors.
Thus, rather than a uniform test that all courts must apply to determine what
constitutes a “reasonable fee,” courts instead are left to carve out their own
tests, a reality that several courts have lamented.87 Over time, many courts
have adopted the Borel test, which provides:
To determine whether a fee request pursuant to Rule 26(b)(4)(E)
is reasonable, courts consider seven criteria: (1) the witness’s area
of expertise; (2) the education and training required to provide the
expert insight that is sought; (3) the prevailing rates of other
comparably respected available experts; (4) the nature, quality,
and complexity of the discovery responses provided; (5) the fee
actually charged to the party who retained the expert; (6) fees
traditionally charged by the expert on related matters; and (7) any
other factor likely to assist the court in balancing the interest
implicated by Rule 26.88
While the Borel test is more helpful than not, it is highly discretionary by
nature. While some discretion is necessarily part of a “reasonableness”
determination, unnecessary discretion leads to unnecessary disputes.89
86

What constitutes “reasonable fees” will never be subject to black and white rules and
necessarily will involve some discretion. That does not, however, mean that the rule cannot
provide clarity about what factors and/or presumptions the court must apply in making the
determination of whether a certain fee application is “reasonable.”
87 See, e.g., Hose v. Chi. & N.W. Transp. Co., 154 F.R.D. 222, 224 (S.D. Iowa 1994)
(“There is very little authority as to what is meant by the term ‘a reasonable fee’ in Rule
26(b)(4)(C).” (alteration in original omitted) (quoting Goldwater v. Postmaster Gen. of the
U.S., 136 F.R.D. 337, 339 (D. Conn. 1991))).
88 Ovella v. B&C Constr. & Equip., LLC, No. 1:10CV285-LG-RHW, 2012 WL
12883213, at *3 (S.D. Miss. Apr. 18, 2012) (citing Borel v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 265 F.R.D.
275, 276 (E.D. La. 2010)).
89 Indeed, “the time-consuming and expensive judicial process of litigating the fee
question itself” is one of the primary rationales for “the American Rule against fee shifting.”
Risa L. Lieberwitz, Attorneys’ Fees, the NLRB, and the Equal Access to Justice Act: From
Bad to Worse, 2 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 1, 4, 10 (1984).
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In particular, for recurring areas of disputes—i.e., ones that
predominately involve a legal, rather than a fact-based, question—litigants
and courts alike would benefit from a clearer test. One such question of law
that arises is whether it is reasonable for an expert to charge a different—and
higher—hourly rate for time spent in a deposition versus time spent
preparing the expert’s report.90 Without any guidance from the rule (or the
Borel test, if that test has been adopted by the court), parties are left to argue
in good faith how the court should interpret what constitutes a “reasonable
fee.”91
Another area in which recurring disputes occur regarding the same
question of law is whether an expert’s hourly rate for travel time can be the
same as the expert’s rate for performing work. Because the rule is silent,
courts vary greatly in their interpretations of the rule, with some treating this
as a case-by-case inquiry and others establishing a bright-line rule. The most
common of these rules is that an expert’s “reasonable” hourly rate is half of
the expert’s regular rate.92 Still, other courts hold that the travel rate and
90 For example, in Walker v. Spike’s Tactical, LLC, the expert sought to charge
defendant’s counsel $2,500 per hour for an in-person deposition as compared to the $600 per
hour he had charged the plaintiff’s counsel to review records and issue his report. No. 2:13cv-01923-RFB-PAL, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1125, at *4 (D. Nev. Jan. 2, 2015); see also
EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 5481 LBS AJP, 1999 WL 32909, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 1999) (“Indeed, courts most often reduce expert fee requests when the
expert seeks to charge the opposing party a higher rate than the expert charges the retaining
party. (first citing Sublette v. Glidden Co., No. Civ.A. 97-CV-5047, 1998 WL 398156, at *4
(E.D. Pa. June 25, 1998) (“reducing expert fee from $600 per hour to the $200 the expert
charged the retaining party”); then citing Ohuche v. British Airways, No. 97CIV.
1853(JSM)RLE, 1998 WL 240481, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 11, 1998) (“reducing expert fee
where expert charged retaining party less than opposing counsel”); then citing Magee v. Paul
Revere Life Ins. Co., 172 F.R.D. 627, 646 (“reducing expert’s fee from $350 per hour to the
$250 the expert charged retaining party”); then citing Jochims v. Isuzu Motors, Ltd., 141
F.R.D. 493, 496–97 (S.D. Iowa 1992) (“expert’s fee reduced from $500 to $250, because,
inter alia, ‘[i]t is double the highest hourly rate he is charging the Plaintiff’ who retained
him”); then citing Draper v. Red Devil, Inc., 114 F.R.D. 46, 48 (E.D. Ark. 1987) (“In the
absence of proof as to the reason(s) why the expert charged counsel for the Plaintiff $110.00
and counsel for the defense $120.00 hourly, the fee will be determined at the rate of $110.00
per hour.”); then citing Anthony v. Abbott Labs., 106 F.R.D. 461, 464–65 (D.R.I. 1985)
(“expert fee reduced from $420 hourly to $250 hourly, the charge the expert ‘was content to
charge a (friendly) litigant . . . for his time’”); and then citing Mathis v. NYNEX, 165 F.R.D.
23, 26 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (“The court is especially persuaded [that the expert’s fee is
reasonable] by the fact that [the expert] regularly charges the same rate for his consultative
services and is charging plaintiff that rate for his expert services in this case.”))).
91 In a case in which the parties disputed that very issue, the court began its analysis by
remarking on the lack of authority: “Both sides cite Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) to support their
respective positions. Both sides acknowledge that there are very few cases deciding the issue
before the court.” Walker, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1125, at *4.
92 See, e.g., Ndubizu v. Drexel Univ., No. 07-3068, 2011 WL 6046816, at *3 (E.D. Pa.
Nov. 16, 2011) (“For example, the Eastern District of New York created a rule that
compensation for travel time should be half the normal rate.” (citing Mannarino v. United
States, 218 F.R.D. 372, 377 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (“The general rule, which this court follows, is
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work rate can be the same.93 Like many issues that arise under the feeshifting rule, there is a lack of uniformity among the courts.
Likewise, as to what travel expenses are reasonable, courts that shift
such expenses end up engaging in a highly-factual analysis of the expenses
billed.94 Courts have, for example, declined to shift expenses for “first class
travel or first class accommodations.”95 It is not uncommon for courts to
play the role of a human resources officer, analyzing and policing what daily
hotel rate is reasonable, for example: “the Court finds the $970 for 2 nights
in a hotel for Dr. Maister to be excessive—despite the high cost of New York
hotel rooms—and reduces that amount to $400 (i.e., a $570 reduction).”96
Finally, in determining reasonableness, some courts look behind the
scenes to which party caused the travel time and expenses.97 For example,
if the retaining party could have but did not hire an expert closer, the court

that compensation for travel time should be half the regular hourly amount charged.”))); Reit
v. Post Props., Inc., No. 09 Civ. 5455(RMB)(KNF), 2010 WL 4537044, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.
4, 2010) (quoting Mannarino, 218 F.R.D. at 377); Dwyer v. Deutsche Lufthansa, AG, No.
CV 04-3184(TCP)(AKT), 2007 WL 526606, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2007) (“[The expert’s]
compensation should not be at the full hourly rate charged for rendering professional services.
Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that Defendants shall pay Plaintiff’s expert for his travel
time at half of his normal rate, or $ 175, and reasonable travel expenses.” (citation omitted)).
93 See, e.g., Handi-Craft Co. v. Action Trading, S.A., No. 4:02 CV 1731 LMB, 2003 WL
26098543, at *17 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 25, 2003).
The hourly fee charged by an expert for deposition time has also been
held reasonable for a measure of compensation for travel time. Mr.
Martin claims the same rate for travel time as that claimed for deposition
time. Therefore, the court will order plaintiff to pay Mr. Martin his
deposition rate for the time spent traveling from his home in the United
Kingdom to St. Louis for his deposition.
Id. (first citing Magee, 172 F.R.D. at 647; and then citing David Tunick, Inc. v. Kornfeld, 151
F.R.D. 534, 536 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)).
94 There is no uniformity about what travel expenses are reasonable for experts, even in
arms-length transactions. See Todd Hatcher, How to Manage an Expert Witness’ Travel Fees,
EXPERT INST. (Feb. 21, 2017), https://www.theexpertinstitute.com/how-to-manage-an-expertwitness-travel-fees/.
While experts usually charge set hourly fees for relevant tasks such as
court testimony, depositions and file reviews, the proper compensation
for an expert’s travel expenses can be a more uncertain, nebulous area. It
doesn’t help that there are no set standards which dictate how to handle
experts’ travel costs.
Id.
95 Frederick v. Columbia Univ., 212 F.R.D. 176, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); see also 28
U.S.C. § 1821(c)(1) (2012) (“Such a witness shall utilize a common carrier at the most
economical rate reasonably available.”).
96 EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 5481 LBS AJP, 1999 WL 32909, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 1999).
97 See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, § 2034 (“Perhaps no overarching rule is appropriate,
but judicial sensitivity to the underlying considerations surely is.”).
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might hold that it is unreasonable to reimburse the expert for such expenses.98
On the other hand, if the deposing party insisted on the expert traveling to
the jurisdiction to be deposed, rather than going to the expert or conducting
a phone deposition, the court might use that to justify the “reasonableness”
of shifting the travel fees and expenses.99 Inquiries into which party
“caused” travel time to be incurred are not, however, universal. Many courts
do not consider this factor as part of the “reasonable fees” prong. Thus, this
variation in the interpretation of what constitutes “reasonable” ends up being
litigated. Without clear language in the rule or a uniform interpretation,
litigants understandably disagree about what the deposing party is required
to pay. Whether the disputes end up in court or not, they are expensive and
time-consuming, and could be circumvented by adding presumptions to the
rule.
A final issue that arises under the “reasonableness” prong, and that
reveals a limitation of the Borel test, concerns the fifth factor: “(5) the fee
actually charged to the party who retained the expert.” Experts sometimes
will charge a flat fee to the party that retained them, and then charge an
hourly rate to the deposing party.100 While Borel directs a court to compare
98

See Don Zupanec, Reimbursing Expert’s Travel Expenses, 19 FED. LITIGATOR 16

(2004).
[D]istrict court said the plaintiff was free to select an expert of his choice,
regardless of where the person was located. But the defendants would not
be compelled to pay the additional costs resulting from the decision to
retain someone from Georgia. This was especially true since the plaintiff
made no showing, or even claimed, that no acceptable security experts
were available in the New York area. . . . A party retaining a “distant”
expert who doesn’t show that no similarly qualified “local” expert is
available should not be surprised if the court is reluctant to require the
deposing party to pay the expert’s entire travel expenses to and from a
deposition.
Id. (citing Lent v. Fashion Mall Partners, L.P., 223 F.R.D. 317, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)).
99 See, e.g., Hillmann v. City of Chicago, No. 04 C 6671, 2017 WL 3521098, at *10
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 16, 2017).
Although Plaintiff did at one point raise the prospect of a telephonic
deposition of White, in the same correspondence Plaintiff requested dates
of availability for his deposition “here in Chicago.” And Plaintiff
ultimately confirmed that the deposition would take place in Chicago.
Given the parties’ agreement that White’s deposition would take place in
Chicago, Plaintiff’s retrospective objection that the deposition could have
been telephonic is not a basis to deny costs.
Id. (citing BASF Corp. v. Old World Trading Co., No. 86 C 5602, 1992 WL 229473, at *3
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 11, 1992) (“A joint decision on where to hold a deposition does not constitute
any logical basis for refusing to grant witness travel costs which are actually incurred.”));
Handi-Craft Co. v. Action Trading, S.A., No. 4:02 CV 1731 LMB, 2003 WL 26098543, at
*16 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 25, 2003) (“The court first notes that it is plaintiff who is demanding that
Mr. Martin’s deposition continue in St. Louis, and not via telephone. Thus, it is clear that
plaintiff should be responsible for Mr. Martin’s travel costs to St. Louis.”).
100 See, e.g., Walker v. Spike’s Tactical, LLC, No. 2:13-cv-01923-RFB-PAL, 2015 U.S.
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those rates, an apples-to-apples comparison is not possible. Many courts
then simply disregard this factor, notwithstanding the fact that it is arguably
the most important way to gauge reasonableness—what the market has
freely paid for the expert.101
The great variation in how courts interpret what constitutes “reasonable
fees” has real consequences for litigants and experts. First, it means that the
rate that is deemed “reasonable” for identical work may vary simply because
of the location of the court in which the case is pending. An expert testifying
in two different federal courts may be reimbursed in one court for time spent
traveling at the expert’s full rate, but may be reimbursed at half of that rate
in the other court. Likewise, one court may conclude that it is per se
unreasonable to charge different rates for deposition time and writing the
report, while another may conclude that it is presumptively reasonable to do
so. That lack of uniformity is the opposite of what is expected from a federal
rule of procedure.102 It also is unfair, insofar as the relative dollar amounts
at stake are high.103
Dist. LEXIS 1125, at *4 (D. Nev. Jan. 2, 2015) (highlighting that expert billed deposing
attorney $2,500 per hour for an in-person deposition as compared to the $600 per hour he had
charged the plaintiff’s counsel to review records and issue his report).
101 For example, in Mathis v. NYNEX, the court was “especially persuaded [that the
expert’s fee was reasonable] by the fact that [the expert] regularly charge[d] the same rate for
his consultative services and [wa]s charging plaintiff that rate for his expert services in this
case.” 165 F.R.D. 23, 26 (E.D.N.Y. 1996). Even so, in cases in which courts are critical of
the fact that an expert cannot arrive at an hourly rate for the work he or she did for the retaining
party, courts nevertheless throw out that factor rather than taking its absence as a strike against
the reasonableness of the fees requested. See, e.g., Garnier v. Ill. Tool Works, Inc., No.
04CV1825(NGG)(KAM), 2006 WL 1085080, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2006).
With respect to the fee actually being charged to the retaining party,
defendants’ counsel, in response to this Court’s order, has represented
that Dr. Glass cannot in good faith estimate the time he expended
examining plaintiff and preparing a report of that examination. The Court
is troubled by this position, given that Dr. Glass has testified as an expert
in over 500 cases, and claims to have examined “thousands of plaintiffs
and defendants in civil law suits.” Dr. Glass should be able to estimate
the amount of time he expended in this case, but has not done so. In any
event, this factor is not dispositive; instead, the Court must balance the
defendants’ need for competent experts with the need to protect the
opposing party with being “unfairly burdened by excessive ransoms
which produce windfalls for the defendants’ expert.”
Id. (alterations in original omitted) (quoting Magee v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 172 F.R.D.
627, 645 (E.D.N.Y. 1997)).
102 See Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Establish Uniformity, FED. JUDICIAL CTR.,
https://www.fjc.gov/history/timeline/federal-rules-civil-procedure-establish-uniformity (last
visited Aug. 10, 2018) (“The rules, which went into effect on September 16, 1938, after
gaining congressional approval, ensured that the procedure followed in federal courts
throughout the nation would be consistent and uniform.”).
103 See, e.g., Neutral Tandem, Inc. v. Peerless Network, Inc., No. 08 C 3402, 2011 WL
13199213, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 1, 2011) (demonstrating a case where one side sought
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In addition, the lack of guidance concerning what standard courts
should apply as to what is “reasonable” means that litigants and experts alike
lack notice of what a given court will deem reasonable. If everything is
discretionary, then litigants can be expected as advocates to engage in
disputes about what is reasonable. Such disputes, even if they never go
before a court, waste time and resources when the rule could provide
guidance that would limit the range of what is reasonable. Litigants may pay
“unreasonable” rates because the expense of litigating the issue in court
outweighs any upside from litigating.
ii.

Reasonableness of Flat Fees

In addition to disputes about the “reasonableness” of the expert’s billed
hourly rate and expenses, other “reasonableness” disputes arise when experts
charge a “flat fee” for their deposition, rather than billing by the hour. The
rule does not address the practice of flat fee billing. Experts who charge a
flat fee justify it on the ground that they are “forced” to set aside a full day
for the deposition, regardless of whether it finishes early. Although many
courts have opined that “flat fees are generally disfavored,”104 the practice
continues.
Indeed the case law is replete with instances in which the parties dispute
whether flat fees are reasonable. Notably, these are not cases in which the
amount of the flat fee—for example, $750 per day versus $3000 per day—is
disputed. Rather, these cases address the basic interpretative question of
whether flat fees are “reasonable” and thus permitted. Further, these disputes
involve significant sums.105 It is not uncommon for experts to charge more
than $2500 for a deposition, regardless of its length.
Courts that address this issue note that “[f]lat fees for experts are
generally considered to be unreasonable.”106 Courts rightfully “expect some
$38,759.13 in fees under Rule 26(b)(4)(E) and the other side sought $72,426.74).
104 Garnier, 2006 WL 1085080, at *2 (first citing Carafino v. Forester, No. 03 Civ.
6258PKLDF, 2005 WL 1020892, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 2005); and then citing Ramirez v.
Marriott Corp., No. 98 Civ. 7007, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23390 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 2005)).
105 See Ndubizu v. Drexel Univ., No. 07-3068, 2011 WL 6046816, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Nov.
16, 2011) (expert charged “a flat fee of $2,500 for his deposition testimony”); Garnier, 2006
WL 1085080, at *1 (detailing a dispute regarding “a flat rate of $4,000 for a full day
deposition, $2,500 for four hours, . . . $1,500 for two hours[,]” or “a flat fee of $4,500 . . .
should it take place at” a more distant location, or “a rate of $450 per hour for the deposition,
applying the same rate for time spent preparing for and traveling to the deposition”); EEOC
v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 5481 LBS AJP, 1999 WL 32909, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 21, 1999) (flat fee of $12,000 per day billed).
106 Nnodimele v. City of New York, No. 13-CV-3461 (ARR), 2015 WL 4461008, at *2
(E.D.N.Y. July 21, 2015); see also Kreyn v. Gateway Target, No. CV-05-3175 (ERK)(VVP),
2008 WL 2946061, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. July 31, 2008) (“A flat fee for an expert’s appearance . . .
is generally unreasonable.”); Garnier, 2006 WL 1085080, at *2 (noting that “flat fees are
generally disfavored” and denying the expert’s request for a flat fee).
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reasonable relationship between the services rendered and the remuneration
to which an expert is entitled.”107 “By its nature, a flat fee runs counter to
this principle because it is simply not reasonable to require parties in every
case to pay the same amount regardless of the actual ‘services rendered’ or
‘time spent complying with the requested discovery.’”108 Even when the flat
fee charge would, as a practical matter, yield a “reasonable” hourly rate,
courts typically still hold the flat fee unreasonable: “[T]he fact that the
agreed-upon hourly rate multiplied by the number of hours actually incurred
in this particular instance happens to approximate the requested flat-rate fee
does not render the use of a flat flee more reasonable.109
Still, without a settled rule, experts continue to frequently bill for
depositions at a flat-fee rate, leading to costly disputes in which courts
address the relative merits of flat-fee billing. An expert typically will
contend that it is “reasonable . . . to charge a flat fee for deposition testimony
because [the expert] is unavailable to do other work on the day of the
deposition.”110 Because depositions have a start time but no end time,
experts often end up setting aside more time than ultimately needed. On the
other hand, the fact that depositions last for varying lengths of time is,
according to some courts, a reason not to charge a flat fee.111
iii.

Reasonableness of Number of Hours Billed

Finally, disputes regarding the “reasonableness” of experts’ fees arise
in the context of the number of hours billed by the expert. This issue arises
for time billed for preparation time, travel time, or other time that, unlike the
time spent in the deposition, is not objectively computable. Thus, in those
cases where a court holds that fees for preparation and travel time are
recoverable under the rule, the debate then shifts to how many hours are
reasonable.112 While what constitutes a “reasonable” number of hours
billed—like an expert’s hourly rate—will vary in cases, courts can and do
107 Nnodimele, 2015 WL 4461008, at *2 (citing Mannarino v. United States, 218 F.R.D.
372, 375 (E.D.N.Y. 2003)).
108 Id. (alterations in original omitted).
109 Id. (“That the bottom line of the [expert’s] bill approximates the amount sought here
is purely coincidental, and does not make [the expert’s] flat fee any more reasonable.” (citing
Mannarino, 218 F.R.D. at 375)); cf. Marin v. United States, No. 06 Civ. 552(SHS), 2008 WL
5351935, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2008) (“In general, it is not reasonable to request a flat fee
for deposition testimony regardless of the number of hours actually spent.”).
110 Id. at *3.
111 See id. (“In any event, plaintiff conveniently ignores that [the expert] charges this flat
fee regardless of the length of the deposition, which necessarily would have an effect on
whether he was available to do other work on the day of a deposition.”).
112 See Auto. Rentals, Inc. v. Keith Huber, Inc., No. 1:10CV385-LG-RHW, 2012 WL
12854841, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 10, 2012) (“Rather, [the defendant] disputes the number of
hours claimed for preparation and review of documents in anticipation of the deposition.”).
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employ presumptions and rules of thumb about ratios and other formulas that
provide clarity and uniformity, at least within the employing court. The rule
itself contains no guidance.
While no uniform approach exists, many federals courts across the
country have adopted a “reasonableness” ratio ranging from 1:1 to 3:1
between time spent preparing for a deposition and time spent actually being
deposed.113 Some district courts that handle a high volume of fee disputes,
such as the Northern District of Illinois, have arrived at a formula that further
makes the ratio dependent on the complexity of the case, namely:
To determine whether an expert’s preparation time was
reasonable, courts in this district have looked “to the preparation
time in relation to the deposition time, and the nature or
complexity of the case, to establish a reasonable ratio of
preparation time to actual deposition time for the case.” Courts
have approved of a 1:1 ratio up to a 3:1 ratio depending on the
nature of the required document review, breadth of the expert’s
involvement, and difficulty of the issues. Also relevant is how the
expert spent his time and the specificity with which the expert
describes that time in the invoice.114
Courts’ use of ratios limits the magnitude of hours that can be shifted for
preparation time, and thus lessens concerns about the deposing party having
to pay for preparation time over which it has no control.115
113 See, e.g., Rote v. Zel Custom Mfg. LLC, No. 2:13-cv-1189, 2018 WL 2093619, at *4
(S.D. Ohio May 7, 2018) (“The Court acknowledges that such preparation-to-deposition
ratios . . . have generally been found to be reasonable.” (citing Script Sec. Sols., LLC v.
Amazon.com, Inc., No. 2:15-CV-1030-WCB, 2016 WL 6649721, at *6 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 10,
2016) (reviewing a vast sampling of cases addressing ratios and concluding that “many courts
have limited the recovery to preparation time that does not exceed the amount of deposition
time, and most have declined to require payment . . . when the ratio of preparation time to
deposition time exceeds three to one”))); Keith Huber, Inc., 2012 WL 12854841, at *1;
Neutral Tandem, Inc. v. Peerless Network, Inc., No. 08 C 3402, 2011 WL 13199213, at *5
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 1, 2011) (“Therefore, the formula employed by in Nilssen to determine a
reasonable number of hours for deposition-preparation time is appropriate, which is a ratio of
three times the length of the deposition.” (citing Nilssen v. Osram Sylvania, Inc., No. 01 C
3585, 2007 WL 25771, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 23, 2007))).
114 LK Nutrition, LLC v. Premier Research Labs, LP, No. 12 CV 7905, 2015 WL
4466632, at *3 (N.D. Ill. July 21, 2015) (citations omitted).
115 See Nester v. Textron, Inc., No. 1:13-CV-920 RP, 2016 WL 6537991, at *4 (W.D.
Tex. Nov. 3, 2016).
While Defendant is correct that some courts have chosen not to
reimburse any preparation time, the concerns of these courts—that the
deposing party has no control over how much time an expert prepares,
and that an expert’s preparation may largely consist of trial preparation—
can be addressed by limiting, rather than excluding, reimbursement for
deposition for preparation time.
Id. (citing Rock River Commc’ns, Inc. v. Universal Music Grp., 276 F.R.D. 633, 636 (C.D.
Cal. 2011)).
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Courts vary in terms of how much detail the expert is required to
provide about the preparation work she performed, often due to the
perception that this is an area in which “misuse” could occur. One court, for
example, stated:
Although this court recognizes that the experts’ preparation
time falls within the ratios of preparation to deposition time that
in some cases have warranted reimbursement, it agrees [that the
retaining party] (or its experts) has not done enough to
demonstrate how that time was spent to satisfy the court that it
was reasonably spent in responding to discovery within the
meaning of Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i).116
The court noted that “to simply take the adverse party’s unsupported word
for the amount of preparation time involved is to hand it a tool of oppression
to misuse.”117 This court’s concern is more than theoretical; in numerous
cases, experts have billed for double-digit hours of preparation time—for
example, twenty-three hours of preparation for a thirteen-hour deposition118
and fourteen hours of preparation for an eight-hour deposition.119
Other courts, while allowing recovery for some preparation time,
exclude from fee shifting any hours billed for time spent preparing with the
retaining counsel. Other courts scrutinize what level of review is reasonable
in order to prepare for a deposition and reach differing conclusions. For
example, in a case where the court made a modest adjustment to the expert’s
hours spent for deposition preparation (fourteen hours billed reduced to ten
hours recoverable), it took the expert’s hours as a presumptive starting point,
and reduced those hours only where clearly excessive:
Nevertheless, while the Court declines to impose a
categorical limit on the type of record review that warrants
reimbursement under Rule 26(b)(4)(E), that is not to say that the
record review in this case was therefore reasonable. In preparation
for drafting his expert report, Pollini spent an estimated 12 to 17
hours reviewing the record. Two months later, Pollini spent 14
hours reviewing nearly the exact same materials to prepare for his
deposition. While Pollini need not merely review his report and
116

LK Nutrition, LLC, 2015 WL 4466632, at *3 (“Even courts that have viewed payment
for deposition preparation as mandatory under Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i) have excluded fees where
the experts do too little to justify the amount of time spent preparing.”).
117 Id. at *3 (alterations in original omitted) (citing Profile Prods., LLC v. Soil Mgmt.
Techs., Inc., 155 F. Supp. 2d. 880, 887 (N.D. Ill. 2001)).
118 See EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 5481 LBS AJP, 1999 WL 32909,
at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 1999) (“The Court nevertheless is troubled by the preparation time
billed by J & H expert Dr. Becker, who charged for 23 hours of deposition preparation time.
No other J & H expert billed for more than 9 hours of preparation time.”).
119 See Nnodimele v. City of New York, No. 13-CV-3461 (ARR), 2015 WL 4461008, at
*5–6 (E.D.N.Y. July 21, 2015).
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contemporaneous notes as defendants suggest, the latter,
duplicative record review appears to be excessive, especially in
light of Pollini’s decades of experience with police practices, his
prior experience testifying as an expert, and the fact that the issues
in the case are not especially technical or complex.120
In contrast, other courts have emphasized that, with respect to deposition
preparation time, Rule 26(b)(4)(E) should be applied with caution “since that
time usually includes much of what ultimately is trial preparation work for
the party retaining the expert.”121
Regardless of whether a court takes a presumptively reasonable or
presumptively unreasonable approach, the cases in this area tend, as in the
above excerpt, to be fairly detailed with respect to the facts of the given cases
and the policy considerations at issue. These same policy discussions arise
in case after case, with each court determining anew its test for
“reasonableness.”122 Like what is included in “time spent responding to
discovery,” what fees are “reasonable” need not be so ill-defined. As
described below, the rule could and should have presumptions that guide
reasonableness.123
B. Logistical Problems: Disputes Arising from the Rule’s Failure to
Address When and How Fees Shift
In addition to interpretative problems regarding what fees are
“reasonable,” logistical problems also arise under the rule. Even so, nothing
in the rule addresses these logistical questions. It leaves litigants and courts
alike to make educated guesses about, for example, when fee payments are
due, what consequences arise from an expert’s failure to make mandatory
disclosures, and what the process is for enforcing the rule when disputes
arise.
1. Disputes Regarding Timing of When Fees Must Be Billed
and Paid
The rule contains no provision regarding when the experts’ fees should
be billed and when payment for fees is due. Without any guidance from the
rule, the topic of when fees must be billed and, even more so, paid has been
highly litigated. Most of the disputes about the timing of fees fall under two
categories: (1) whether fees must be prepaid if the expert so demands; and

120

Id. at *5 (citing Mannarino v. United States, 218 F.R.D. 372, 376 (E.D.N.Y. 2003)).
Constellation Power Source, Inc. v. Select Energy, Inc., No. 3:04cv983 (MRK), 2007
WL 188135, at *8 (D. Conn. Jan. 23, 2007) (citing WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, § 2034).
122 See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, § 2034 (“Compensation for time spent preparing
for the deposition has proved a divisive issue.”).
123 See infra Part V.B.2.
121
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(2) whether fees must be billed within a certain time frame in order to shift.
i.

Timing for Payment of Fees

Although the rule is intended to be self-executing and to require
minimal, if any, involvement by the court, the gap regarding when fees are
due has spawned extensive and costly motions practice. Without a clear rule
as to when fees must be paid, lawyers—being lawyers—may end up
litigating that issue, often at great expense to their clients, the opposing
parties, and the court.
Because the rule does not expressly require that fees be determined and
paid before the deposition, some lawyers contend that payment before the
discovery occurs is not required. This, however, is not a universally accepted
interpretation of the rule. In fact, many courts have ordered parties to pay
the opposing expert’s deposition fees before the deposition occurs. Other
courts have held that there is no basis in the rule for fees to be prepaid—and
have pointed out the logistical challenges of prepayment given the uncertain
length of most depositions—and thus have denied motions for fees to be
prepaid. These courts have made clear that it is the retaining party’s
“responsibility” to pay the expert, and that “Rule 26 entitles Defendants’
counsel [only] to reimbursement for ‘reasonable fees’ in connection with
[the] deposition.”124
The problem does not lie primarily in the substantive question of
whether litigants should have to advance payment or simply provide
reimbursement; while the reimbursement approach is more sensible for the
practical reasons identified by courts, an advance payment approach could
arguably be workable if certain safeguards were put in place.125 Instead, the
problem lies with the fact that there the rule provides no clear guidance. That
lack of guidance means that experts and litigants alike do not know what is
required or permitted by the rule, so they end up spending time and money
disputing the issue of when fees are due.

124 AP Links, LLC v. Russ, No. CV 09-5437 (JS) (AKT), 2015 WL 9050298, at *3
(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2015) (emphasis in original) (quoting Conte v. Newsday, Inc., No. CV
06-4859 (JFB) (ETB), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88546, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2011)).
125 For example, in the MDL Protocol, the court issued multiple directives regarding how
fees must be billed and when fees must be paid. Among other items, the court ordered that
expert’s fees would be “due and owing within a period of thirty (30) days from the date of
receipt by counsel responsible for payment” and provided a “fifteen (15) day grace-period for
payment after the initial thirty (30) days expires.” MDL PROTOCOL, supra note 69, ¶ 4. The
protocol goes on to note that once a fee is “due and owing, interest shall accrue at a rate of
3.5% per month for the length of time the invoice remains unpaid” and that a party who has
failed to pay expert fees due and owing may not “utilize the transcript of that deposition in
any motion.” Id. ¶ 6. The protocol does not address, however, when fees can be billed, and
leaves open the question of whether an expert can demand advance payment.
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Take, for example, the all-too-common scenario of an expert, whether
on his own accord or at the behest of the retaining attorney, who threatens
not to appear for his deposition unless he is paid for his time in advance.126
What happens in this situation? As it turns out, any number of things may
happen, all of which waste time and resources. First, the lawyers engage in
a back-and-forth exchange of emails and likely phone calls about the
reasonableness or unreasonableness of the request for prepayment, each
pointing to some supporting but unauthoritative authorities. This back-andforth results in one of three things: (1) the expert may relent and agree to be
paid after the deposition, typically as long as the deposing lawyer agrees to
indeed pay the expert; (2) the deposing lawyer may relent and agree to pay
the expert in advance; or (3) neither side budges, much like the Zaxes in the
Dr. Seuss classic.127 If neither side budges, no agreement is reached.
The deposing lawyer may elect to file a motion with the court, asking
the court to order the expert to appear for the deposition without the advance
fee payment or with a reasonable fee advanced. The retaining lawyer may
elect to file a motion with the court,128 asking the court to order the deposing
party to advance the expert’s fees. Or the retaining lawyer instead may send
a letter informing opposing counsel that the expert will not attend the
deposition without payment in advance, thus attempting to shift the burden
to the deposing party. That lawyer may either: (1) ignore the letter and move
forward with the deposition; or (2) bring a motion to compel the expert’s

126 For example, the expert in Santella apparently threatened that “he might refuse to
attend his deposition should the matter of his fee not be resolved in his favor.” Santella v.
Grizzly Indus., Inc., No. A-11-CA-181 LY, 2012 WL 12882000, at *1 n.1 (W.D. Tex. Nov.
14, 2012). While not directly addressing that threat, the court stated that its “ruling is not
intended to address the propriety of exclusion of [the expert’s] testimony in that
circumstance.” Id.
127 After much back-and-forth with the equally stubborn North-Going Zax, the SouthGoing Zax threw down the gauntlet and the zero-sum game played out:
“And I’ll prove to YOU,” yelled the South-Going Zax,
“That I can stand here in the prairie of Prax
For fifty-nine years! For I live by a rule
That I learned as a boy back in South-Going School.
Never budge! That’s my rule. Never budge in the least!
Not an inch to the west! Not an inch to the east!
I’ll stay here, not budging! I can and I will
If it makes you and me and the whole world stand still!”
DR. SEUSS, The Zax, in THE SNEETCHES AND OTHER STORIES 27, 27 (1961).
128 Lawyers have styled such motions in various ways. See, e.g., Rote v. Zel Custom Mfg.
LLC, No. 2:13-cv-1189, 2018 WL 2093619, at *1 (S.D. Ohio May 7, 2018) (motion to
compel); AP Links, LLC, 2015 WL 9050298, at *1 (motion to preclude or, alternatively, to
order expert to appear for deposition); Handi-Craft Co. v. Action Trading, S.A., No. 4:02 CV
1731 LMB, 2003 WL 26098543, at *13–14 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 25, 2003) (“Motion for Protective
Order and Other Relief[] requesting that the court enter a protective order requiring, inter alia,
that plaintiff adequately compensate two of defendant’s expert witnesses.”).
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attendance at the deposition.129 Not surprisingly, the deposition often does
not occur even when the deposing lawyer elects to “move forward” with it.
Instead, the deposing lawyer appears, makes a record, and then brings a
motion to compel the expert to appear at the deposition at a later date, as well
as to recover costs for fees and costs of the aborted deposition.
Courts, like lawyers, handle this matter in various ways. Some courts,
if requested, will order the deposing party to pay some or all of the expert’s
fees in advance.130 Others will order the expert to appear with the condition
that the deposing party agrees to pay the fees within a fixed number of days
post-deposition.131 Other courts will simply compel the expert to appear.132
In refusing to require advance payment, these courts sometimes note the
inability of the court or deposing party to foresee how long the deposition
may take and thus what payment is required.133 Finally, when the expert has
129 One party, when faced with an opposing expert who refused to appear for his
deposition because of a dispute about advance payment of his flat fee, brought a motion to
exclude the expert from testifying at trial or, in the alternative, to appear for a deposition. AP
Links, LLC, 2015 WL 9050298, at *1 (noting that “the parties’ dispute arose when they were
unable to agree whether Plaintiffs’ counsel was required to pay the flat fee sought by [the
expert] in advance of his deposition”).
130 E.g., Garnier v. Ill. Tool Works, Inc., No. 04CV1825(NGG)(KAM), 2006 WL
1085080, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2006) (“[The expert] shall receive a 50% down payment
on his fee seven days in advance of his deposition, with the balance to be remitted within two
business days following his deposition.”).
131 See, e.g., Dwyer v. Deutsche Lufthansa, AG, No. CV 04-3184(TCP)(AKT), 2007 WL
526606, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2007). Some courts take a hybrid approach, such as
requiring some prepayment of expert fees with the balance due post-deposition. Not
surprising, some of these orders are rather intricate for a seemingly straightforward matter.
With respect to Dr. Glass’s requirement that he be paid for his
services in advance of his deposition, the Court orders that Dr. Glass be
paid a 50% down payment on the estimated fee seven days in advance of
his deposition, assuming that he will be deposed for seven hours, with the
balance to be remitted within two business days following his deposition.
The payment of the balance may be stayed in the event that plaintiff’s
counsel seeks modification of the hourly rate for the reasons set forth
[previously]. The Court notes that plaintiff’s counsel has represented that
his “firm is guaranteeing payment” of Dr. Glass’s fee.
Garnier, 2006 WL 1085080, at *4.
132 See, e.g., Santella v. Grizzly Indus., Inc., No. A-11-CA-181 LY, 2012 WL 12882000,
at *2–3 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 14, 2012) (stating that “neither party nor the Court has discovered
any legal authority requiring the reasonableness of an expert’s hourly fee be determined prior
to the taking of the deposition and that the fee be tendered prior to the deposition[,]” and
ordering appearance without prepayment); Burdette v. Steadfast Commons II, LLC, No. 2:11980-RSM, 2012 WL 3762515 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 29, 2012) (ordering appearance without
prepayment).
133 See, e.g., AP Links, LLC, 2015 WL 9050298, at *3 (“[A]n expert ‘may not insist on
advance payment, and may not set a flat fee before he knows what he will be called upon to
do; he may instead charge only a reasonable hourly fee.’” (quoting Johnson v. Spirit Airlines,
Inc., No. CV 07-1874 (FB)(JO), 2008 WL 1995117, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. May 6, 2008))). The
issues are not whether the expert will be paid in advance if she so requires. It is who will pay
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failed to appear on the day for which the deposition was noticed, some courts
will require the retaining party to pay the deposing party for all fees and
expenses incurred because of the expert’s no-show.134
Importantly, the Advisory Committee’s notes to the rule state that the
court may “order payment . . . either as a condition of providing discovery
or after the discovery has been completed,” thus expressing no presumption
either way and, instead, leaving the decision to individual courts on a caseby-case basis.135 Not surprisingly, this perceived discretion invites lawyers
to take opposing positions.136 The result is time and money spent litigating
the expert in advance: the party that retained her or the opposing party. See AP Links, 2015
WL 9050298, at *3 (“The Court will not direct advance payment.” (quoting Almonte v.
Averna Vision & Robotics Inc., No. 11-CV-1088S(Sr), 2014 WL 287586, at *3 (W.D.N.Y.
Jan. 24, 2014)). “As the court explained in Conte, Defendants’ counsel retained [the expert]
and therefore it is ‘his responsibility to pay [the expert].’” Id. at *1 (quoting Conte v.
Newsday, Inc., No. CV 06-4859 (JFB) (ETB), 2011 WL 3511071, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 10,
2011)). “While Rule 26 entitles Defendants’ counsel to reimbursement for ‘reasonable fees’
in connection with [the expert’s] deposition, Plaintiffs’ counsel is under no obligation to pay
[the expert] a flat fee in advance of his deposition.” Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Conte,
2011 WL 3511071, at *3) (citing Johnson, 2008 WL 1995117, at *1).
134 See, e.g., Harris v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 226 F.R.D. 675 (S.D. Cal. 2005) (expert
cancelled deposition because not paid in advance; court said that if no agreement to pay fees
in advance, no obligation to do so; so result there was that the party who was put out by the
expert’s last-minute fit was entitled to attorney’s fees and costs incurred in conjunction with
the cancelled deposition).
135 FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 1970 amendment.
Under subdivision (b)(4)(C), the court is directed or authorized to issue
protective orders, including an order that the expert be paid a reasonable
fee for time spent in responding to discovery, and that the party whose
expert is made subject to discovery be paid a fair portion of the fees and
expenses that the party incurred in obtaining information from the expert.
The court may issue the latter order as a condition of discovery, or it may
delay the order until after discovery is completed. These provisions for
fees and expenses meet the objection that it is unfair to permit one side to
obtain without cost the benefit of an expert’s work for which the other
side has paid, often a substantial sum.
Id. (first citing Walsh v. Reynolds Metal Co., 15 F.R.D. 376 (D.N.J. 1954); and then citing
Lewis v. United Air Lines Transp. Corp., 32 F. Supp. 21, 23 (W.D. Pa. 1940)); see also
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, § 2034. On the other hand, a party may not obtain discovery
simply by offering to pay fees and expenses. Cf. Boynton v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 36
F. Supp. 593 (D. Mass. 1941). Notwithstanding the Advisory Committee note, some courts
have refused to award expert fees in advance on grounds that the rule down not allow it. See,
e.g., Conte, 2011 WL 3511071, at *3 (stating that the rule does not entitle the plaintiff “to
payment in advance” for his expert deposition (first citing FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(E); and
then citing Johnson, 2008 WL 1995117, at *1)).
136 The fact that courts have such discretion does not, of course, necessarily mean that
they will use that discretion to order advance payment. See AP Links, LLC, 2015 WL
9050298, at *2.
Defendants’ counsel asserts that “the Court has discretion to order
advance compensation of an expert” and cites two cases to support this
proposition. However, the Court finds that the circumstances set forth in
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over the simple matter of when fees must be paid.
Further, it is not only the litigants that pay the price for the rule’s lack
of clarity, courts do as well. When faced with disputes about the timing of
fees, courts must not only look into the interpretation of a rule that gives little
guidance, but also into the factual intricacies of the dispute and related policy
arguments.137 While courts may lament the fact that the parties do not just
“work it out on their own,” the rule’s lack of guidance, the inconsistency
among courts’ interpretations, and the “splitting-of-the-baby” that often
occurs in such disputes provides litigants with more reasons to litigate than
not.
ii.

Timing of Request for Fees

Other disputes regarding timing concern when the retaining party must
request fees from the deposing party. Because the only hint in how the rule
should be read comes from an advisory note (and one that many courts do
not mention), courts differ greatly in their interpretation of the rule’s
these two cases are distinct from the instant matter. Defendants’ counsel
has not otherwise shown that, under the facts here, the Court should
exercise its discretion to require Plaintiffs to pay [the expert] in advance
of his deposition.
Id. (alterations in original omitted) (first citing Garnier, 2006 WL 1085080, at *2–4 (plaintiff
disputed the amount of the fee charged by the defendants’ expert, holding that the expert was
entitled to, inter alia, a $350 hourly rate and ordering that the expert “be paid a 50% down
payment on the estimated fee seven days in advance of his deposition”); and then citing In re
“Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 105 F.R.D. 577, 582 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (ordering that the
plaintiffs’ depositions of four of the defendants’ experts in “complex ‘Agent Orange’
multidistrict litigation” was “conditioned on plaintiffs’ payment of reasonable experts’ fees
and expenses incurred in discovery”)).
137 For a painstaking example of these dynamics, see Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc., No. 4:05CV-0273-HLM, 2007 WL 9712069, at *2–3 (N.D. Ga. July 24, 2007). In that case, the court
described dozens of back-and-forth communications among counsel, including letters and
emails to and from the expert:
The total amount I will therefore need in advice [sic] to forward to
her is $2,890.00 total or $963.33 per defendant. The above is based upon
the assumption the 8 hours of deposition time can be completed within
one day if we begin at 9:00 a.m.? . . .
“I need to once again try to clarify Charly Miller’s fees. IN
ADDITION TO THE COST OFAIRFARE [sic], HOTEL, TAXI, FOOD
AND HER DEPOSITION TIME, [s]he charges $50.00 per hour portal to
portal which means she will be traveling away from home about 48 hours.
It takes about 12 hours to get here. She lives about 3 hours from the
airport. Even if we met in Atlanta for the deposition, she would still need
2 nights because YOU ALMOST CANNOT GET HERE FROM THERE.
ALL SAID, I NEED CONFIRMATION THAT THIS IS ACCEPTABLE
AND SHE WILL BE PAID OR WE NEED TO FLY TO NEBRASKA.
Id. (third and fourth alternations in original). The final dollar amount awarded to plaintiff’s
expert was $4011.55, approximately $660.00 more than the deposing counsel offered and
$890.00 less than the retaining party demanded. Id. at *8.
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requirements regarding timing of fees. At the other end of the spectrum from
cases in which fees are requested before the deposition lie those cases in
which no mention is made of payment for expert’s fees until the conclusion
of the litigation. Thus, rather than requesting payment at or around the time
of the expert’s deposition, the retaining lawyer requests such a payment at
the conclusion of the case.138
Courts have handled disputes about the timing of the fee request with
mixed results. Many courts enforce the rule’s fee shifting language
regardless of when the request for fees is made.139 These courts frequently
note the Advisory Committee’s statement that the court may issue an order
to pay fees as a condition of discovery “or may delay the order until after
discovery[,]” as indicative of the propriety of a fee request at any point in the
litigation.140 These courts also note that, whether expressly requested by
counsel at the time or not, “the Federal Rules plainly provide that notice.”141
Some courts, however, decline to award fees if the retaining party waits
too long to request them. In such situations, the court may decide that fee
shifting is not permitted due to the parties’ failure to discuss it around the
time of the deposition, which created an implied agreement between the
parties not to shift fees.142 At least one court, in refusing to shift expert
138 Sometimes parties request such fees under Rule 26. Other times, parties request
reimbursement for the experts’ fees under Rule 54, which allows the prevailing party in a case
to recover certain costs. FED. R. CIV. P. 54. Notably, Rule 54’s utility is constrained in two
ways: first, it only applies to the prevailing party and second, it only applies to cases in which
there is a final judgment entered. Id.
139 See, e.g., Ndubizu v. Drexel Univ., No. 07-3068, 2011 WL 6046816, at *4 (E.D. Pa.
Nov. 16, 2011) (“The fact that Defendants requested payment of expert fees for the first time
after judgment was entered . . . does not preclude us from granting the motion.” (citing Ellis
v. United Airlines, Inc., 73 F.3d 999, 1011 (10th Cir. 1996))). “In Ellis, the court emphasized
that ‘Rule 26(b)(4)(C) itself does not specify whether or when a party must demand payment
of fees to its expert.’” Id. (first citing Ellis, 73 F.3d at 1011; then citing Rogers v. Penland,
232 F.R.D. 581, 582 (E.D. Tex. 2005); and then citing Fisher-Price, Inc. v. Safety 1st, Inc.,
217 F.R.D. 329, 330 (D. Del. 2003)).
140 See, e.g., Neutral Tandem, Inc. v. Peerless Network, Inc., No. 08 C 3402, 2011 WL
13199213, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 1, 2011) (quoting Chambers v. Ingram, 858 F.2d 351, 360–
61 (7th Cir. 1988)).
In Chambers v. Ingram, the plaintiff prevailed in a jury verdict against
the defendant. . . . The plaintiff argued that his costs, however, were
recoverable under Rule 26(b)(4)(C). The defendant objected because the
plaintiff did not request the expert fees and costs at the time of the
deposition. The Seventh Circuit noted that the Advisory Committee notes
to Rule 26(b) stated that the court may issue an order to pay fees as a
condition of discovery “or may delay the order until after discovery.”
Thus, the court held, “we do not believe that the timing of the plaintiff’s
request for this discovery is a bar to recovery under the rule.”
Id. (citing 858 F.2d at 360–61).
141 Ndubizu, 2011 WL 6046816, at *4.
142 See Matthews v. United States, 756 F. Supp. 511, 515 (D. Kan. 1991) (“The court is
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discovery fees post-trial under the rule, has expressed hostility to attempts to
shift fees post-judgment, calling the party’s request for such fees a “lateblooming argument” and “just silly.”143 The Court stated that
Rule 26(b)(4)(C) . . . is a discovery rule, it applies equally to both
sides, and if the parties had intended to charge one another for the
time their numerous experts spent in responding to discovery, they
should have raised the issue at the initial Rule 16 conference, or at
least at some point before the discovery was undertaken.144
2. Disputes Regarding Fee Requests When the Expert’s
Mandatory Disclosures and Report are Deficient
Occasionally, litigants ask courts to deny fee shifting on grounds that
the expert failed to comply with Rule 26(a)(2)(B).145 Experts are required to
disclose, before their deposition,146 a report that provides their opinions in a
without legal authority under Rule 26(b)(4)(C) to order payment of fees and expenses incurred
in taking the deposition of plaintiff’s expert witness. Presumably, the deposition was taken
upon the parties’ agreement subject to whatever conditions and terms that were reached.”).
143 Leggett & Platt, Inc. v. Vutek, Inc., No. 4:05CV788 CDP, 2007 WL 607736, at *1
(E.D. Mo. Feb. 22, 2007).
144 Id. In that case, the court’s hostility was likely based in part on the fact that the
retaining party was seeking “expert witness fees of almost a million dollars.” Id. The party
seeking the fees also was the prevailing party, so although the court cites Rule 26(b)(4)(C), it
also references the fact that “that provision has nothing to do with a prevailing party’s right
to recover costs[,]” suggesting perhaps that the request was made in the context of a bill of
costs. Id. Still, other courts have treated a request for expert discovery fees submitted as part
of a bill of costs as nonetheless compensable under Rule 26(b)(4)(C). See, e.g., Halasa v. ITT
Educ. Servs., Inc., 690 F.3d 844, 850 (7th Cir. 2012) (collecting cases in which the “district
courts have taken different approaches to the way in which § 1821 applies to motions for costs
under Rule 26(b)(4)(E) when those particular items are also addressed in § 1821” (citations
omitted)).
145 This issue comes up with some regularity, so much so that a federal practice form for
expert fee motions includes this argument. See, e.g., 3A JAY E. GRENIG, WEST’S FEDERAL
FORMS § 21:37 (5th ed.), Westlaw (database updated 2018).
It has been argued, in informal discussion of this matter (i.e. at the pretrial
conference), that Plaintiffs had a choice as to whether to depose the
defense experts, and, having made that choice, should pay the cost of
doing so. This is, it is respectfully submitted, a specious argument. In
the absence of making discovery, Plaintiffs would have been fatally
disadvantaged at trial. The defense expert reports, for the most part,
contained nothing more than net opinions. Few set forth the materials
reviewed or the facts on which the experts intended to rely. None set
forth compensation or a listing of other cases in which the witness has
testified as an expert at trial or by deposition within the preceding four
years.
Id.
146 The requirement that expert disclosures come before the deposition appears in a
different rule—the rule that permits parties to depose the opposing expert. See FED. R. CIV.
P. 26(b)(4)(A). This rule provides that “[a] party may depose any person who has been
identified as an expert whose opinions may be presented at trial. If Rule 26(a)(2)(B) requires
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given case, the bases for such opinions, the documents examined and relied
upon, as well as information about their background, experience, prior
testimony, and fee schedule. Disclosures exist for a reason. For example,
one court has explained the significance of disclosure of prior testimony as
the way “to give the other party access to useful information to meet the
proposed experts’ opinions” and noted that “[t]he proliferation of marginal
or unscrupulous experts will only be stopped when the other party has
detailed information about prior testimony.”147
Thus, when experts fall short in their disclosures, litigants may argue
that the failure to disclose should negate, or at least reduce, the shifting of
fees. The argument is premised on the fact that a deposition under such
circumstances is not only necessary, but also necessarily longer, absent
complete and accurate disclosures.148
In one case, the deposing party “argue[d] that he should not be required
to reimburse Defendants because the reports submitted by some of the
experts were deficient under the Federal Rules’ disclosure requirements.”149
The “expert’s noncompliance with this provision,” the litigant argued, “is a
deficiency that renders reimbursement of that expert’s fees unreasonable.”150
The court acknowledged that the experts had failed to include required
information in their reports.151 Although recognizing this deficiency and the
impact on the deposing party having “to spend time in a deposition
a report from the expert, the deposition may be conducted only after the report is provided.”
Id. (emphasis added). “[T]he disclosure of prior recorded testimony is designed to give the
other party access to useful information to meet the proposed experts’ opinions. The
proliferation of marginal or unscrupulous experts will only be stopped when the other party
has detailed information about prior testimony.” Elgas v. Colo. Belle Corp., 179 F.R.D. 296,
300 (D. Nev. 1998).
147 Elgas, 179 F.R.D. 296 at 300.
148 See generally Motion in Limine by Defendant, Stanczyk v. Prudential Insur. Co. of
Am., No. 1:15-cv-0097 (N.D. Iowa Apr. 28, 2017), 2017 WL 1632874. The author litigated
a case in which the opposing expert testified that he had participated in hundreds of cases, yet
failed to disclose a list of his prior testimony as required by the rule. Instead, he brazenly
stated in his expert disclosure: “Let me note that I have never maintained a list of cases of
medical record reviews, Independent Medical Examination, depositions, or trial appearances.
Thus, I am unable to produce any list of my prior work where I have been asked to serve as
an expert.” That same expert, nonetheless, characterized the nature of his prior testimony as
“pro-defendant” in an effort to bolster the credibility of his opinions on behalf of the Plaintiff
in that case: “In general probably 90 percent of my work is defense work.”; “And, you know,
I think it’s important to note that I call things the way they are. I’m pretty well-known for
doing that. And the majority of my work is defense work.” There is no realistic way for a
party to test the accuracy and veracity of an expert’s characterization of his prior testimony,
and its consistency with testimony in the case at hand, without having access to his prior
testimony. See generally id.
149 Ndubizu v. Drexel Univ., No. 07-3068, 2011 WL 6046816, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 16,
2011).
150 Id.
151 See id.
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developing that information when it should have been included in the
report[,]” the court deemed that “impact” to be “nominal.”152 It reduced each
experts’ compensation by one-half hour, which likely covered but a fraction
of the amount the deposing party incurred in litigating the issue.153
In another case, the deposing party contended that it should not have to
pay for the experts’ depositions because the experts had failed to disclose
their hourly rate as required under Rule 26(a)(2)(B).154 It argued that it
should not have to pay the experts’ allegedly “‘excessive’ charges which [it]
would not have agreed to pay had [it] known the experts’ rates before the
depositions.”155 The court disagreed, stating that “the fact that the fees were
not agreed to or disclosed ahead of time does not preclude defendant from
seeking reimbursement for its experts under Rule 26.”156 It reasoned that,
because “the timing of a party’s request for discovery cost is not a bar to
recovery under Rule 26[,]” the fact that the experts’ rates were not known in
advance was not consequential.157 While that reasoning is consistent with
several courts’ admonishments that litigants should bring fee disputes to the

152 Id. In another case, Garnier v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., the expert demanded advance
payment of $4000 seven days before the scheduled deposition, yet had not provided adequate
expert disclosure. No. 04CV1825(NGG)(KAM), 2006 WL 1085080, at *1, *4 (E.D.N.Y.
Apr. 24, 2006). The deposing party thus requested that the court order that the fees for the
soon-to-occur deposition not be shifted due to the disclosure failure. Id. at *4. The court
simply ordered the plaintiff to do what the rule already had required, stating: “[T]hey shall
furnish to plaintiff complete expert disclosures, including court information, docket numbers,
party and counsel names, and dates, for [the expert] in accordance with Rule 26 within three
business days of the entry of this order.” Id. (citing Coleman v. Dydula, 190 F.R.D. 316, 318
(W.D.N.Y. 1999) (Rule 26(a)(a)(B) requires disclosure of “the list of cases in which the
witness has testified[, which] should at a minimum include the name of the court or
administrative agency where the testimony occurred, the names of the parties, the case
number, and whether the testimony was given at a deposition or trial”)). While an order to
comply was no doubt necessary, without any consequences other than the already-existing
obligation to comply with the rule, it is unlikely the order would have much effect on that
expert or the retaining party the next time around. Indeed Rule 37(a)(3)(A), which governs
discovery sanctions, already requires compliance without a motion to compel. See FED. R.
CIV. P. 37(a)(3)(A); see also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, § 2289.1 (“The sanction is
automatic in the sense that there is no need for the opposing party to make a motion to compel
disclosure, as authorized by Rule 37(a)(3)(A) in order to compel a further disclosure, as a
predicate for imposition of the sanction of exclusion.”).
153 Indeed, the costs involved in disputing fees discourages some litigants from
challenging patently unreasonable fee awards. As one commentator has explained: “[T]he
cost of challenging excessive fees can, in some instances, be greater than simply paying the
fee in the first place. So again, the fees get paid.” Canepa, supra note 2.
154 This Rule requires “a statement of the compensation to be paid for the study and
testimony in the case.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(B)(vi).
155 Handi-Craft Co. v. Action Trading, S.A., No. 4:02 CV 1731 LMB, 2003 WL
26098543, at *18 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 25, 2003).
156 Id.
157 Id. (citing Chambers v. Ingram, 858 F.2d 351, 360–61 (7th Cir. 1988)).
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court “after the deposition has been completed,”158 the court failed to
acknowledge the difference between the disclosure of fees versus an
agreement about fees—the former of which is required by the rule.
While not highly litigated, this aspect of the rule would nonetheless
benefit from making explicit what is implicit. Namely, at its core, the fee
shifting rule contemplates that there has been a full and accurate disclosure,
including a complete report.159 It is that extensive disclosure that forms the
rationale behind the fee shifting rule and, specifically, why it is fair to shift
fees. When that implicit tradeoff—fees shifting in exchange for a full and
thorough disclosure—breaks down because of incomplete disclosure, so too
does the underlying rationale and fairness behind the fee shifting rule.
3. Disputes Regarding the Process for Handling and Enforcing
Fee Disputes
The rule contains no mention of the process for handling and enforcing
fee disputes. It does not mention when and how a party should bring the
dispute to court, nor does it address who bears the burden of proof.
Complicating that void is the rule’s overarching language that makes the fee
shifting mandatory “unless manifest injustice would result.” Taken together,
these aspects of the rule create unnecessary (or unnecessarily costly)
litigation and strike the wrong balance.
Courts appear to uniformly hold that it is the retaining party that bears
the burden of proof on the question of fee shifting.160 Plaintiffs, in this case,
bear the burden of establishing that each expert’s fee is reasonable.161 If an
expert’s fee is unreasonable, the Court may, in its discretion, simply fashion
a reasonable alternative.162
158 AP Links, LLC v. Russ, No. CV 09-5437 (JS) (AKT), 2015 WL 9050298, at *2
(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2015) (“If the parties are unable to agree upon the reasonableness of [the
expert]’s fee, they may make an application to the Court after the deposition has been
completed.” (first citing Conte v. Newsday, Inc., No. CV 06-4859 (JFB) (ETB), 2011 WL
3511071, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2011); and then citing Biernacki v. United States, No. 11CV-973(Sr), 2012 WL 6100291, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2012))).
159 See supra Part II.A, B.
160 In the author’s experience, it is not uncommon for the retaining attorney to pass along
the expert’s invoice, which may be sorely lacking in detail or description despite requesting a
large sum, as if the retaining lawyer is nothing more than the courier. The rule encourages
this mentality to the extent it does not suggest rigorous scrutiny at any juncture of whether the
requested fee should be shifted, but instead seems to imply a rubber stamp in all but the most
extreme situations. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(E).
161 See Fiber Optic Designs, Inc. v. New Eng. Pottery, LLC, 262 F.R.D. 586, 589 (D.
Colo. 2009).
162 See Nester v. Textron, Inc., No. 1:13-CV-920 RP, 2016 WL 6537991, at *5 (W.D.
Tex. Nov. 3, 2016) (“Plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing that each expert’s fee is
reasonable under Rule 26(b)(4)(E)(i). If an expert’s fee is unreasonable, the Court may, at its
discretion, fashion a reasonable alternative.” (citing Fiber Optic Designs, Inc., 262 F.R.D. at
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But saying that the retaining party bears the burden of proof and
actually holding the party to that burden are two different matters. In
numerous cases, courts suggest that both parties failed to explain why or why
not the fees billed were reasonable, even though that burden lies with only
one party.163 And even when there is a noted lack of evidentiary support
regarding the reasonableness of fees, courts still largely award such fees with
only minor reductions.164 Likewise, in cases in which the lack of evidence
produced by the party who bears the burden of proof renders the court unable
to assess a critical factor, the courts still award fees and simply ignore that
missing factor.165
Despite how few words the rule contains, it decidedly puts a thumb on
the scale in favor of fee shifting in two separate places, no matter how large
the bill or extreme the claimed fees. First, it states that fees shift “unless
manifest injustice” would result, implying that there has to be an
exceptionally compelling reason not to shift fees.166 Second, it says that the
589; then citing Jensen v. Lawler, 338 F. Supp. 2d 739, 747 (S.D. Tex. 2004); and then citing
Borel v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 265 F.R.D. 275, 276 (E.D. La. 2010))); Ball v. LeBlanc, No
13-00368-BAJ-SCR, 2015 WL 5793929, at *1 (M.D. La. Sept. 30, 2015).
163 See, e.g., EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 5481 LBS AJP, 1999 WL
32909, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 1999) (“And because neither the EEOC nor J & H has
provided the Court with any useful information about other factors, the Court . . . will focus
on the rate the expert usually charges and the rate the expert charges the retaining party (here,
J & H), tempered by the Court’s sense of what is unreasonable.” (citing McClain v. OwensCorning Fiberglas Corp., No. 89 C 6226, 1996 WL 650524, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 7, 1996)
(“The court may use its discretion, however, where the parties offer scant evidence in support
of their positions” as to reasonable expert fees.))).
164 See, e.g., Reit v. Post Props., Inc., No. 09 Civ. 5455(RMB)(KNF), 2010 WL 4537044,
at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2010) (acknowledging that the retaining party “failed to submit
competent evidence . . . to support Dr. Head’s request for compensation” and thus “did not
meet [its] burden of showing that Dr. Head’s requested fees are reasonable[,]” yet concluding
in the apparent absence of evidence that “$400 is a reasonable hourly fee for Dr. Head’s
preparation time as well as his deposition time”).
165 See, e.g., Garnier v. Ill. Tool Works, Inc., No. 04CV1825(NGG)(KAM), 2006 WL
1085080, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2006).
With respect to the fee actually being charged to the retaining party,
defendants’ counsel, in response to this Court’s order, has represented
that Dr. Glass cannot in good faith estimate the time he expended
examining plaintiff and preparing a report of that examination. The Court
is troubled by this position, given that Dr. Glass has testified as an expert
in over 500 cases, and claims to have examined “thousands of plaintiffs
and defendants in civil law suits.” Dr. Glass should be able to estimate
the amount of time he expended in this case, but has not done so. In any
event, this factor is not dispositive; instead, the Court must balance the
defendants’ need for competent experts with the need to protect the
opposing party with being “unfairly burdened by excessive ransoms
which produce windfalls for the defendants’ expert.”
Id. (alterations in original omitted) (quoting Magee v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 172 F.R.D.
627, 645 (E.D.N.Y. 1997)).
166 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(E).
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court “must order” the fee shifting.167 Of course, the rule also says that only
“reasonable fees” are shifted.168 Yet, in failing to set parameters as to what
is reasonable, the rule leaves wide discretion to courts already predisposed
to shift whatever fees are billed. Likewise, the rule’s lack of attention to
what level of scrutiny and oversight the court should apply undermines
whatever teeth the “reasonable fees” language was intended to supply, and
stands in stark contrast to any other fee-shifting rule. So, while it is true that
a few courts have scrutinized and drastically limited the amount of fees that
are shifted,169 those courts are in the minority.

167

The MDL Protocol resolves much of this ambiguity regarding how disputes are
handled by establishing protocols that favors the presumptive fee request. MDL PROTOCOL,
supra note 69. Most notably, the protocol establishes methods of resolution for disputes
regarding fees, such as providing that a party must “disput[e] the reasonableness of an expert’s
deposition fee . . . within thirty (30) days upon receipt of the expert’s invoice” or be deemed
to have waived any objection to the fees. Id. ¶ 9. The protocol further specifies that if a party
has to file a motion to compel for payment of expert fees, “to the extent the motion proves
successful, at the discretion of the court the moving party may be entitled to assess from the
delinquent party the costs of collecting including reasonable attorney fees.” Id. ¶ 10. The
protocol does not contain a similar paragraph for shifting attorneys’ fees to the deposing party
if the motion proves unsuccessful.
168 Auto. Rentals, Inc. v. Keith Huber, Inc., No. 1:10CV385-LG-RHW, 2012 WL
12854841, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 10, 2012) (“[T]he Court ‘has discretion to limit or alter those
costs if they appear to be unreasonable.’” (quoting Knight v. Kirby Inland Marine Inc., 482
F.3d 347, 356 (5th Cir. 2007))).
169 For example, one court recognized the risk of abuse in expert fee shifting:
To be sure, we live in an age where a grown man may be paid a
seven figure annual salary to dribble a small round ball. But, the forces
of the marketplace are at work in such a situation: not only supply and
demand, but the variegated effects of the superstar’s presence on
attendance, television revenues, and the all-hallowed won/lost record.
And, most important, the employer and the employee square off and
bargain at arm’s length in order to determine an equitable stipend, each
with something to lose and something to gain. In the Rule 26(b)(4)(C)
context, however, such factors are noticeably absent; the plaintiffs have
handpicked the expert, and the defense has neither options nor bargaining
power if it desires to obtain the pretrial discovery which the rule permits.
Unless the courts patrol the battlefield to insure fairness, the
circumstances invite extortionate fee-setting.
In the final analysis, the mandate of Rule 26(b)(4)(C) is not that an
adverse expert will be paid his heart’s desire, but that he will be paid a
“reasonable fee.” The ultimate goal must be to calibrate the balance so
that a plaintiff will not be unduly hampered in his/her efforts to attract
competent experts, while at the same time, an inquiring defendant will
not be unfairly burdened by excessive ransoms which produce windfalls
for the plaintiff’s experts. Decisionmaking in this entropic field must be
fair to the parties, equitable vis-a-vis the witness, and comprehensible to
the community at large.
Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc., No. 4:05-CV-0273-HLM, 2007 WL 9712069, at *6–7 (N.D. Ga.
July 24, 2007) (quoting Anthony v. Abbott Labs., 106 F.R.D. 461, 464–65 (D.R.I. 1985)).
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Exacerbating the problem is the lack of consequences for unfair play
under the rule. It is almost unheard of in the context of Rule 26(b)(4)(E) for
the court to award attorneys’ fees to the party that prevails on the fee-shifting
motion. For example, even when a court recognizes deficiencies or
unreasonableness in one party’s fee demand, it still does not award attorneys’
fees. For example, in AP Links, LLC, the deposing party brought a motion
to require the expert to appear for his deposition. The expert had refused to
appear unless the deposing party paid him a flat fee in advance of the
deposition. The case was pending in the Eastern District of New York, a
jurisdiction that had well-established law that an expert “may not insist on
advance payment, and may not set a flat fee before he knows what he will be
called upon to do.”170 Even so, the court refused to award attorneys’ fees to
the party that was forced to bring the motion, stating:
Finally, the request by Plaintiffs’ counsel that he be awarded
attorneys’ fees in connection with bringing the instant motion is
DENIED. Plaintiffs’ counsel has not cited any case law in support
of his conclusory request, nor has he identified the rule or legal
authority demonstrating his entitlement to the relief he seeks. The
parties are cautioned that if, going forward, the Court finds that
either party is not operating in good faith with regard to the issues
referenced in this Order, the Court will take appropriate action.171
It is hard to understand the court’s statement that the moving party did not
“identif[y] the rule . . . demonstrating his entitlement” to fees given that the
motion, like all discovery disputes, clearly falls under the purview of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 37. In addition, the court’s reticence to shift
attorneys’ fee is a little ironic since the underlying rule is a fee-shifting
provision, such that relative fairness concerns should be heightened.
C. Policy Problems: Issues Arising from the Rule’s Overbreadth
In some of the areas in which the rule is clear, it strikes the wrong
balance. First, it does so by requiring fee shifting even for discovery of
experts who have not submitted expert reports. Second, it does this by
invoking the term “unless manifest injustice would result.”
170 AP Links, LLC v. Russ, No. CV 09-5437 (JS) (AKT), 2015 WL 9050298, at *3
(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2015) (quoting Johnson v. Spirit Airlines, Inc., No. CV 07-1874 (FB)(JO),
2008 WL 1995117, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. May 6, 2008)).
171 Id.; see also Rote v. Zel Custom Mfg. LLC, No. 2:13-cv-1189, 2018 WL 2093619, at
*6 (S.D. Ohio May 7, 2018) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(5)(A)(iii) and denying moving
party’s “request for attorney’s fees incurred in bringing this Motion . . . as unjust under the
circumstances”). As ironic as it may be, the one case in which a court entertained the
possibility of awarding attorneys’ fees, the attorney had not requested them: “Defendant . . .
did not request an award of attorneys’ fees and expenses in its Motion. If Defendant . . . had
made such a request, the Court would have given serious consideration to granting it.” Mann,
2007 WL 9712069, at 8 n.4.
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1. The Problem with Shifting Fees for Experts Who Have Not
Submitted Reports
The fee shifting rule applies to discovery of all experts, but some
experts are not subject to the mandatory disclosures and do not have to
submit reports. These experts, sometimes called “non-retained experts,” are
experts who are “not retained or specially employed to provide expert
testimony in the case.”172
Numerous reasons exist as to why experts who do not have to provide
a report should not be included in the fee shifting rule. The expert discovery
fee shifting rule is premised on the fact that the expert to be deposed has
already provided a complete and detailed disclosure and report, and thus a
deposition is viewed as less necessary and more discretionary. Therefore,
similar to the argument that fees should not shift when an expert submits an
incomplete or deficient report,173 the argument is that, with no report, a
deposition is hardly a luxury but rather a necessity.
In addition, the expert discovery rule is premised on the proposition that
it is “unfair” for the deposing party to get for free what the other party had
to pay for—a proposition that has no validity in the context of an expert who
has not submitted a report. By their very nature, experts who are not required
to submit reports have not been retained, and thus have not been paid by one
party for opinions reached and work performed in the litigation.
Accordingly, there exists no concern that the deposing party will “get for
free” what the other party has had to pay for. Finally, the deposition of an
expert who has not provided a report will likely take longer. Thus, the
potential “unfairness” cuts in the opposite direction, insofar as it is unfair for
the deposing party to have to pay for the expert to sort through what her
opinions are, the bases for them, and more during the deposition.
2. The Problem with Shifting Fees for Experts Who Are the
Party’s Employee
For somewhat similar reasons, it is problematic to include experts who
are “the party’s employee” under the fee shifting rule. First, only large,
corporate defendants are likely to have such employees and thus are the only
parties who benefit from such a rule. Second, an expert “whose duties as the

172

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(B) (“Unless otherwise stipulated or ordered by the court, this
disclosure must be accompanied by a written report—prepared and signed by the witness—if
the witness is one retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony in the case or
one whose duties as the party’s employee regularly involve giving expert testimony.”). It is
beyond the scope of this Article to address which experts fall into which categories—suffice
to say that is a less-than-clear delineation, e.g., should a treating physician be treated as an
expert that must provide a report. See Shea, Kreps & Solade, supra note 1, at 1.
173 See supra Part III.B.2.
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party’s employee regularly involve giving expert testimony” most likely is
salaried and thus has no market-based hourly rate. In addition, not shifting
such an expert’s fees does not raise the fairness concerns that exist with
regard to specially retained experts. It is typical for a party to pay for the
time its own employee, whether a layperson or expert witness, spends
responding to discovery. Litigation is, by definition, burdensome and
expensive for parties, and responding to discovery is one of the biggest
burdens. Even so, the discovery rules do not provide for fee shifting, and
parties already incur significant discovery-related expenses occasioned by
the other side’s discovery requests and performed for the other side’s benefit.
If those requests are irrelevant, unduly burdensome, or otherwise
objectionable, the party has the ability to seek a protective order. No
justification exists to treat discovery costs related to a party’s expert
employee any differently than those costs for non-expert employees.
3. Problems Arising from the “Unless Manifest Injustice Would
Result” Language
The rule’s introductory language that a court must require that an
expert’s “reasonable fees” be shifted “[u]nless manifest injustice would
result” is also problematic.174 Such language is more commonly found in
rules of criminal law and procedure than in a rule of civil procedure.175 In
any event, what “manifest injustice” entails is not defined in the rule.176 The
advisory notes to the rule suggest that the standard relates only to the ability
of the deposing party to pay.177 Thus, as one court has described it: “Implicit
in the ‘manifest injustice’ caveat[] is that a ‘rich’ party should not be allowed
to agree to pay excessively high fees to its expert in order to prevent a
‘poorer’ opposing party from being able to afford to depose the expert.”178
174

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(E).
See GRENIG, supra note 145, § 21:37 (discussing areas in which the “manifest
injustice” standard arises, including “retroactive application of statutory provisions” and
“departure on manifest injustice ground” under Federal Sentencing Guidelines, and Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 16 governing pretrial orders). Notably, in Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 16(e), which permits the court to modify the final pretrial order “only to prevent
manifest injustice,” unlike Rule 26, the rest of the rule contains detailed substantive and
procedural provisions that explain and justify the “manifest injustice” language. FED. R. CIV.
P. 16(e).
176 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(2)(b)(4)(E).
177 See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, § 2034 n.28 (“Even in cases where the court is
directed to issue a protective order, it may decline to do so if it finds that manifest injustice
would result. Thus, the court can protect, when necessary and appropriate, the interests of an
indigent party.” (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 1970 amendment)).
178 EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 5481 LBS AJP, 1999 WL 32909, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 1999) (citing Pudela v. Swanson, No. 91 C 3559, 1993 WL 532546, at *3
(N.D. Ill. Dec. 20, 1993) (“Plaintiffs may have less financial resources than defendants, but
they are not ‘indigent’ . . . [and] this court perceives no injustice in requiring them to pay the
175
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Even so, other courts suggest that the “unless manifest injustice would
result” language serves as a general safeguard against unreasonable fee
shifting.179 The case law, however, reveals that to be more aspirational than
actual—other than a party’s abject inability to pay, the manifest injustice
language provides no safeguard.180
To the contrary, the unintended effect of that language has been to
justify the lack of scrutiny applied to experts’ fee requests. It is not
uncommon for courts to rubber-stamp the shifting of extraordinary expert
fees on grounds that the fees do not offend the “manifest injustice” caveat.
Because that reflects a misunderstanding of the limited safeguard that the
language actually supplies, the impact of the rule’s limited safeguard—that
the fees must be “reasonable”—ends up being minimized.181
Experts come in all forms—some charge exorbitant rates and tack on
fees to their invoices for anything remotely related to the deposition, whereas
others err on the side of caution, and charge only for actual time spent in the
deposition. The thumb on the scale that arises from the “unless manifest
injustice would result” standard incentivizes and rewards less scrupulous
experts to shift greater expenses, while at the same time disincentivizing the
deposing party from challenging such fees.
IV. OVERALL IMPACT OF CURRENT RULE’S SHORTCOMINGS
Fee shifting of any variety is extraordinary in the American legal
system and perhaps for good reason—the inherent and unintended
consequences of fee shifting are many.182 Thus, on the rare occasion in

fees charged by their opponents’ experts for time spent in testimony at deposition.”) (“That,
however, is not the case here. There is no disparity between J & H’s and the EEOC’s ability
to afford experts.”)).
179 See, e.g., Reit v. Post Props., Inc., No. 09 Civ. 5455(RMB)(KNF), 2010 WL 4537044,
at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2010) (“Absent any evidence that manifest injustice would result
from failing to pay Dr. Head for the time he ‘reserved’ for the March 12, 2010 deposition, the
Court finds that charge to be unreasonable.”).
180 In Rogers v. Penland, the district court did reference the “manifest injustice” standard
in denying fee-shifting to an expert who was subsequently excluded from the case on Daubert
grounds: “To require a party to pay for the costs of a witness who was not even called, and
against whom the court had sustained a Daubert challenge is manifestly unjust.” 232 F.R.D.
581, 583 (E.D. Tex. 2005).
181 See Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc., No. 4:05-CV-0273-HLM, 2007 WL 9712069, at *6
(N.D. Ga. July 24, 2007) (“The mandatory language of the rule is tempered by two limitations:
1) the costs may not be imposed if doing so would result in manifest injustice, and 2) the
expert’s fees must be reasonable.” (quoting Gwin v. Am. River Transp. Co., 482 F.3d 969,
975 (7th Cir. 2007))).
182 While these reasons are beyond the scope of this Article, for an interesting discussion
of them, see David A. Root, Note, Attorney Fee-Shifting in America: Comparing,
Contrasting, and Combining the “American Rule” and “English Rule”, 15 IND. INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 583, 607–09 (2005).
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which fee shifting is permitted, the statute or rule is typically carefully
worded to achieve its purpose. Not so with Rule 26(b)(4)(E), however. That
rule represents an anomaly not only from the typical ebb and flow of
litigation, but also from other fee shifting rules. Despite its drastic impact—
forcing one side to pay the other side’s expert that it neither selected nor
entered into an arm’s length agreement with—the rule is plagued by the
problems detailed in Part III. Taken together, these problems impact civil
litigation involving experts in numerous, global ways.
First, disputes about the rule’s interpretation abound because there is
no clarity or uniformity regarding what types of fees the rule covers or
standards for reasonableness. These disputes cost litigants and the courts
time and money, and are avoidable with a better drafted rule.
Second, the lack of uniformity is anathema to the federal rules, which
are premised on the uniform application of rules in the federal court system.
Third, discovery fees are often shifted even when the expert’s work was
not controlled by or for the benefit of the deposing party. This is not only
unfair to the deposing party, but likely results in experts being paid
unreasonable sums.
Fourth, the rule lacks mechanisms to fairly and efficiently shift fees
and, in particular, provide the parties with proper incentives. Ideally, the
retaining party and expert should be incentivized to only bill for truly
reasonable fees, and the deposing party should be incentivized to only pay
for truly reasonable fees.
Fifth, the rule strikes the wrong balance in terms of the courts’
involvement. It tends to disincentivize and minimize a court’s role in the
areas in which a court is most sorely needed while involving the court for
matters that are of little consequence.
Sixth, the problems with the rule are not resolving themselves, thus
necessitating correction by amendment. The rule’s lack of clarity, combined
with the dearth of appellate review, has resulted in long-standing
inconsistency.
V.

FIXING THE RULE: PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE RULE AND BENEFITS

When a rule consistently yields inconsistent interpretations and unfair
results, as this rule has for almost twenty-five years, it is time to amend it.183
The proposed changes to the rule are set forth below, followed by an
explanation of the changes and related benefits.

183 While the rule has been in effect for longer, the 1993 amendment that freely permitted
expert depositions triggered the slew of problems discussed in this Article. See supra note
30.

SHELTON (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

DISCOVERY OF EXPERT WITNESSES

2/11/2019 12:14 PM

523

A. Proposed Amended Rule 26(b)(4)(E)
The proposed amended rule is below, the version showing the changes
is first, followed by a clean version that incorporates all of the changes.
Revised Rule Showing All Changes Proposed to Current Rule
Unless manifest injustice would result, The Except as provided in part
(vi), the court must require that the party seeking discovery . . . pay the an
expert who is required to submit a report under Rule 26(a)(2)(B) a reasonable
hourly fee for time spent in responding to discovery under Rule
26(b)(4)(A):.”
(i) “Time spent responding to discovery” includes only: (1) the actual time
the expert spends in a deposition, including any breaks during the day,
and does not include time or fees spent preparing for a deposition,
traveling to or from a deposition, reviewing a deposition transcript, or
time otherwise relating to being deposed; and (2) time the expert spends
responding to written discovery requests and/or subpoenas served by the
opposing party that require the expert to perform work that is not already
required under the disclosure rule.
(ii) In determining what constitutes “reasonable fees,” the party that retained
the expert has the burden to prove that the amount billed is reasonable,
both in terms of hourly rate and the number of hours billed. The hourly
rate that the retaining party actually paid for the expert’s work is the
presumptively reasonable rate.
(iii) The request for payment of fees may not be filed until after the expert
discovery has occurred and must include an itemized statement that
includes the date and purpose for the hours billed, the rate at which each
hour was billed, and a statement of the hourly rate that the expert has
been paid by the retaining party. The request must be personally signed
and attested to by both the expert and the retaining attorney.
(iv) Any objection to the request for fees, including an objection arising
under (vi)(4), must be filed within fourteen days of the date on which the
request was filed or is deemed waived.
(v) Unless a resistance to the request for fees has been timely filed: (1)
payment by the deposing party of the reasonable fees is due within thirty
(30) days of the date on which the request for fees was filed; and (2)
interest accumulates daily for any unpaid and due balance at the statutory
rate for judgments, and is automatically added on to the amount due and
owing. If a resistance to the request for fees was timely filed, fees are
not due until the court enters an order specifying the amount, if any, that
must be paid. If the resistance is deemed frivolous, the court shall order
that interest be paid from the date on which payment was due absent the
resistance.
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(vi) No payment is required if: (1) the party that engaged the expert failed to
comply with and serve complete and accurate disclosures and a report as
set forth in Rule 26(a)(2)(B) seven or more days before the date of the
expert’s deposition; (2) the party that engaged the expert fails to file a
request for fees that complies with part (iii) within 30 days after
completion of the discovery to which the fee request relates; (3) the
witness is the party’s employee; or (4) manifest injustice would result
due to the financial circumstances of the deposing party.
Revised Rule Incorporating All Proposed Changes
Except as provided in part (iv), the court must require that the party
seeking discovery . . . pay an expert who is required to submit a report under
Rule 26(a)(2)(B) a reasonable hourly fee for time spent in responding to
discovery under Rule 26(b)(4)(A)
(i) “Time spent responding to discovery” includes only: (1) the actual time
the expert spends in a deposition, including any breaks during the day,
and does not include time or fees spent preparing for a deposition,
traveling to or from a deposition, reviewing a deposition transcript or
time otherwise relating to being deposed; and (2) time the expert spends
responding to written discovery requests and/or subpoenas served by the
opposing party that require the expert to perform work that is not already
required under the disclosure rule.
(ii) In determining what constitutes “reasonable fees,” the party that retained
the expert has the burden to prove that the amount billed is reasonable,
both in terms of hourly rate and the number of hours billed. The hourly
rate that the retaining party actually paid for the expert’s work is the
presumptively reasonable rate.
(iii) The request for payment of fees may not be filed until after the expert
discovery has occurred and must include an itemized statement that
includes the date and purpose for the hours billed, the rate at which each
hour was billed, and a statement of the hourly rate that the expert has
been paid by the retaining party. The request must be personally signed
and attested to by both the expert and the retaining attorney.
(iv) Any objection to the request for fees, including an objection arising
under (vi)(4), must be filed within fourteen days of the date on which the
request was filed or is deemed waived.
(v) Unless a resistance to the request for fees has been timely filed: (1)
payment by the deposing party of the reasonable fees is due within thirty
(30) days of the date on which the request for fees was filed; and (2)
interest accumulates daily for any unpaid and due balance at the statutory
rate for judgments, and is automatically added on to the amount due and
owing. If a resistance to the request for fees was timely filed, fees are
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not due until the court enters an order specifying the amount, if any, that
must be paid. If the resistance is deemed frivolous, the court shall order
that interest be paid from the date on which payment was due absent the
resistance.
(vi) No payment is required if: (1) the party that engaged the expert failed
to comply with and serve complete and accurate disclosures and a report
as set forth in Rule 26(a)(2)(B) seven or more days before the date of the
expert’s deposition; (2) the party that engaged the expert fails to file a
request for fees that complies with part (iii) within 30 days after
completion of the discovery to which the fee request relates; (3) the
witness is the party’s employee; or (4) manifest injustice would result
due to the financial circumstances of the deposing party.
B. Breakdown of Proposed Amendments to the Rule and Related
Benefits
1. Changes to “Costs of Responding to Discovery”
As discussed, many disputes arise under the rule due to the lack of
clarity and resulting inconsistencies regarding what is included in “costs of
responding to discovery.”184 The proposed amended rule should eliminate
virtually all of these disputes because it provides a bright-line definition of
what that its terms entail. No longer will parties be uncertain and thus pay
for questionable fees because it is less expensive than bringing a motion.
And no longer will courts be asked to examine and resolve whether and
under what circumstances “preparation time” is covered.
In addition to the time and resources saved, the amended rule strikes a
proper balance in terms of what is covered. Subject to certain caveats
discussed below, there is no question that an expert should be paid for time
spent in the deposition, and that time can be fairly and objectively calculated.
And while it is true that the deposing party is not entirely in control of the
length of the deposition—i.e., a cagey or verbose expert will necessarily take
longer to depose—the deposition’s length is most controlled by that party.
This is especially true given that one of the reasons depositions under the
current rule take longer than the deposing party controls is due to the lack of
complete and accurate expert disclosure and report—a problem that is
directly solved by not shifting fees if the expert has not met his obligation
before the deposition.185 Thus, the rule’s shifting of fees for time spent in
the deposition is sound and workable.

184
185

See supra Part III.A.1.
See supra Part III.B.2.
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But, there is no simple way to determine how much preparation time is
necessitated by the deposition, and even less of a way to determine which
party benefits from that preparation time. Further, the difficulty and risks of
determining whether preparation time and travel time are “reasonable” in
any given case is very factually-intensive and in most cases not warranted.
Any benefits of fee shifting in a given case do not justify the overall
expenditure of courts’ time and resources spent determining which party is
“responsible” for the fact that the expert is incurring such fees.
Thus, the best way to ensure that an expert expends and bills for only a
reasonable amount of preparation time is for that amount to be paid by the
party that retained the expert.186 As one court exploring this issue concluded,
“[t]o the extent that the inquiring party wishes to ensure that an expert is
well-prepared, that party may voluntarily pay for the expert’s preparation
time.”
Likewise, by not including travel time and expenses to and from the
deposition, the rule eliminates disputes about whether and how much travel
time and expenses are covered, as well as the potential abuse that arises by
imposing costs on the other party. Not only has the retaining party not had
to pay the expert for any travel, but the retaining party also knew about the
expert’s location and chose to retain the expert knowing the additional fees
and expenses that would be incurred. In contrast, the deposing party neither
selects, nor benefits from, the expert’s location.
Like lay witnesses who are located outside of the jurisdiction in which
the lawsuit is pending, parties can and should negotiate where expert
witnesses should be deposed. Sometimes the best location will be at the
expert’s location, in which the parties will have to travel. Other times it will
be at the parties’ location, in which case the expert will be required to travel.
Having the rule provide that expert travel expenses should shift to the
deposing party unnecessarily changes the incentives by imposing more of
the expenses of travel on the deposing party. Because the rationale behind
expert fee shifting is that one party should not get for free what the other
party paid for, there is scant rationale for shifting travel expenses, which by
definition the retaining party has not paid for.
The amended rule also strikes a fair balance between the parties. The
party that hired the expert can and should reasonably anticipate that the costs
associated with preparing its expert for deposition and the costs associated
with the expert travelling to and from that deposition are part of that
engagement. Despite the new disclosure rules, it remains typical for parties
in federal cases to depose the opposing expert.187 Thus, those fees are
186 See Eastman v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 14-cv-00703-WQH (WVG), 2016 WL 795881,
at *5 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 29, 2016).
187 See id. (explaining the need not only for deposition but deposition of more than one
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foreseeable and reasonably should be part of what the retaining party
considers as the costs of hiring the expert.
2. Changes to “Reasonable Fees”
As discussed, many disputes arise under the rule due to the definitions
and guidance regarding what constitutes “reasonable fees.”188 First, the
proposed amendment requires that the expert bill the deposing party at an
hourly rate, not a flat fee. In making clear that flat fees are not simply
“disfavored,” they are not allowed, the amended rule will eliminate the
disputes that arise regarding the uncertainty of the question of flat fee
billing.189 Additionally, this change will eliminate a large source of potential
unfairness in the fee shifting rule: the imposition of a large cost on the
deposing party that is untethered to the actual amount of time spent being
deposed.
Further, the rule is not unfair to the expert or to the retaining party. Like
many issues of expert payment, the question is not whether the expert will
get paid her “flat fee” rate, but instead whether the deposing party must pay
it. As one commentator has explained, “If the expert wants a minimum, the
balance should come from the party who hired him and not from [the
deposing party].”190
In addition, the proposed amended rule introduces a presumption that
the experts’ hourly fee charged to the deposing party should be the same as
the hourly fee charged to the retaining party. That presumption is
reasonable.191 A lawyer, for example, does not charge different rates for
office work versus in-court work; all of that work is part of being a lawyer
and equally ties up a lawyer’s time. The same is true of an expert witness
who voluntarily takes on the professional role of an expert witness and, with
that, all of the concomitant roles. The presumption also avoids the risks of

day: “However, with regard to expert witnesses, ‘there may more often be a need for
additional time—even after the submission of the report required by Rule 26(a)(2)—for full
exploration of the theories upon which the witness relies.’” (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 30(d)
advisory committee’s note to 2000 Amendment)).
188 See supra Part III.A.2.
189 For example, despite the fact that flat fees are disfavored and struck down when
brought to a court’s attention, the practice remains prevalent. See Expert Witness Fees: How
Much Does an Expert Witness Cost?, SEAK, https://blog.seakexperts.com/expert-witnessfees-how-much-does-an-expert-witness-cost/ (last visited Aug. 9, 2018) (“33% of all expert
witnesses charge a minimum number of hours for deposition testimony.”).
190 Canepa, supra note 2.
191 See, e.g., Ball v. LeBlanc, No. 13-00368-BAJ-SCR, 2015 WL 5793929, at *2 (M.D.
La. Sept. 30, 2015) (“With respect to Balsamo’s deposition testimony, Defendants assert that
Plaintiffs should only be reimbursed at a rate of $125 per hour because that is the rate that
Balsamo charged Plaintiffs for his services.” (citing Borel v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 265 F.R.D.
275, 277 (E.D. La. 2010))).
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abuse and unfairness to the deposing party.192 Given the lack of any arm’s
length negotiation, it is all-too-easy for the expert to charge the deposing
party a higher rate, such that the deposing party ends up effectively
subsidizing the expert’s work for the retaining party.
Of equal importance, the presumption of a single hourly rate—rather
than a range of rates—provides a bright-line so that litigants have clarity
regarding what rate is “reasonable,” and courts need not expend resources
examining the minutiae of whether and why a billed rate is reasonable. To
the extent an expert demands a higher hourly rate for deposition time than
for writing her report, the retaining party is in the best position to be aware
of that at the time the expert is retained. It can attempt to negotiate the
expert’s rates so that the expert charges a single hourly rate, accept
responsibility for making up any difference in the permitted rate of recovery,
or select a different expert.
The amendment also effectively will require that a party who wants the
benefit of the fee shifting rule must have compensated the expert at an hourly
rate rather than flat fee. While this undoubtedly will create problems for
experts whose practice is to bill a flat fee for their work on behalf of the
retaining party,193 that downside is outweighed by the fact that the hourly
rate an expert charges the retaining party is by far the best measure of the
expert’s actual hourly rate. The risk of unfairness to the deposing party from
the expert having an hourly rate that is, for all intents and purposes, only
charged to the opposing party is significant. Further, because that hourly
rate will serve as a presumption for the rate that is reasonable, many disputes
will be eliminated.

192 See Garnier v. Ill. Tool Works, Inc., No. 04CV1825(NGG)(KAM), 2006 WL
1085080, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2006) (“[A] Court should ‘balance’ a party’s need for
competent experts with the need to protect the opposing party from being ‘unfairly burdened
by excessive ransoms which produce windfalls for the [party’s] experts.’” (quoting Magee v.
Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 172 F.R.D. 627, 645 (E.D.N.Y. 1997))).
193 For example, doctors who perform independent medical exams (“IME”) and medical
record reviews often charge a flat fee for their work rather than an hourly rate. See Alex
Babitsky, How Much Does an IME (Independent Medical Examination) Cost?, IME:
RESOURCES & TRAINING, https://independentmedicalexamtraining.com/how-much-does-anime-independent-medical-examination-cost/ (last visited Aug. 9, 2018) (“A slight majority of
independent medical examiners charge a flat fee for their IMEs.”). While these doctors would
have to change this practice in order to have their deposition fees shifted, that is not a bad
thing overall. A doctor that performs an IME, for example, may charge a $1000 flat fee and
issue a report that necessitates that the retaining party conduct a five-hour deposition. If the
expert charges a rate of $500 per hour for a deposition, that means that the deposing party is
paying 2.5 times as much as the retaining party. That is not only an imbalance that makes
one question whether each party is paying their true portion of the doctor’s work, but it also
significantly lessens the concern that the deposing party is “getting for free” what the other
party had to pay for.

SHELTON (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

2/11/2019 12:14 PM

DISCOVERY OF EXPERT WITNESSES

529

Because preparation time and travel time are not covered by the
amended rule, there is no need to address whether an expert’s hourly rate for
travel should be the same as the rate for work performed. That change to the
rule will eliminate the inconsistencies among courts on this issue and provide
much-needed uniformity in the federal courts.
C. Timing of Payments
As discussed, issues of timing regarding when fees must be paid and
when fees may be billed consume a substantial portion of litigants’ and
courts’ time.194 That is wholly unnecessary and there is no reason that the
rule should not provide clarity regarding the timing issues that routinely
arise.
The proposed change creates bright-lines for when fees must be billed
and when fees must be paid, and it eliminates advance billing. That is
consistent with the better approach under the rule’s current language. The
prohibition of advance billing also makes sense as a practical matter. When
going into a deposition for any witness, whether a lay witness or expert, no
one typically knows how long the deposition will last. Thus, there is no
reliable way to accurately calculate what is a reasonable advance payment.
If the expert insists on advance payment, that can and should be provided by
the retaining party with whom the expert has a professional relationship.
The amended rule also eliminates uncertainty and disputes about when
fees are due. It makes the due date enforceable by making the amount due
automatic and by automatically charging interest on any amount not timely
paid.195 This practice—having a set due date after which time interest
accrues—is consistent with other court-ordered payments.196
D. Make Fee Shifting Contingent on Having an Expert Report
As discussed, under the current rule, expert deposition fees shift for all
experts, including those experts that have not provided a report.197 The
primary justification for fee shifting is the fact that the expert already has
provided a detailed report—and has done so at the expense of the retaining
party—thus reducing or even eliminating the need for a deposition. When
that justification does not exist because there is no report, it does not make
sense and is not fair to shift expert deposition fees.

194

See supra Part III.B.
While the amount of requested fees is presumptively considered reasonable, a party
may file a resistance to a fee request. When that happens, payment is not due until the court
decides the dispute and issues an order. See supra Part V.A.
196 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1961 (2012).
197 See supra Part III.B.3.
195
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For the same reason, fee shifting is not justified when the expert has
failed to provide a complete and accurate report. A report that is deficient—
i.e., does not comply with the disclosure requirements—is, in many respects,
similar to having no report. It makes a deposition unquestionably necessary
in order to learn the information that should have been, but was not,
disclosed. It also makes it likely that the deposition will take longer insofar
as counsel will have to explore information that the expert failed to provide.
In addition, when a report is deficient, the retaining party by definition has
not paid for the expert to do work that the expert was supposed to do, and
there thus exists far less “potential unfairness” that the deposing party will
free ride off work for which the retaining party paid.
Finally, by categorically denying fee shifting when a report is deficient,
the rule provides an incentive for the retaining party and expert to comply
with the disclosure requirement. It is not uncommon for an expert to fail to
include some required information, such as the list of prior testimony. That
failure is significant because it precludes the opposing party from exploring
that prior work in the deposition and eventually at trial. The solution that
some courts have taken—to simply reduce the hours billed for time
attributable to the failure to provide a complete disclosure—is inadequate. It
not only sends the wrong message and provides poor incentives to the
retaining party, but it also results in courts having to make the case-by-case
determination of how much of a reduction in hours is reasonable. That is not
only time consuming when it happens but also costly enough that some
deposing parties will just pay the excess amount because it is less expensive.
This revised rule incentivizes a party to comply with the basic disclosure
requirements and places the burden where it belongs—on the party that has
failed to comply rather than on the deposing party.
E. Process for Fee Disputes
As discussed, the current rule is silent as to how litigants should handle
disputes about fees.198 That leaves uncertain why a party has the obligation
to file a motion if a disagreement occurs, thereby creating the unintended
consequence of the “reasonable” party (or at least the party that ultimately
prevails) having to decide whether to incur the costs of filing a motion, and
sometimes deciding not to. When the latter occurs, the unreasonable party—
i.e., the expert that is charging unreasonable fees or the deposing party who
is refusing to pay reasonable fees—may end up being rewarded in their
unreasonable position.
On the other hand, the current rule’s silence also may imply that there
is no basis to challenge a fee request. Certainly aspects of the rule would
198

See supra Part III.B.3.
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counter this implication, such as if fees cannot be challenged then why does
the rule only provide for payment of “reasonable fees.” As the cases in this
area demonstrate, however, the tendency of courts is to rubber stamp fee
requests rather than apply scrutiny, and having a set process creates balance
and signals the courts’ role.
Because the rule streamlines the question of what fees shift and how
much, it is likely that parties will only rarely have to involve courts in
disputes about fees. What constitutes a reasonable fee should almost never
be disputed given the rule’s bright-lines and presumptions. In instances in
which it is, however, the rule provides the process by which the fee should
be challenged. Further, that process does not automatically penalize the
party that challenges the fees, nor does it automatically reward that party.
Instead, the rule provides that a court must determine if the challenge was
frivolous in its order. If it was, then interest is charged from the date the
payment was due absent the challenge. If it was not frivolous, though, then
the party is not charged with interest.
Related to the fee dispute process, the amended rule should provide in
the advisory notes that disputes arising under this rule are subject to the
provisions of the discovery sanctions rule.199 That means that, if a litigant—
whether the retaining party or the deposing party—takes a frivolous position
that causes the other party to incur attorneys’ fees, a court should consider
that action in the context of the sanctions rule. While an advisory note of
that sort normally would not be necessary, here it is based upon the tendency
under the current rule to not award sanctions when the retaining party acts
unreasonably.200 Because the fee shifting rule should incentivize all parties
to take reasonable positions, an advisory note that makes this clear would be
beneficial. That is particularly true under the revised rule which provides
clarity and bright-lines, such that good faith disputes should be few and far
between.

199

See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(3)(A).
In Rote v. Zel Custom Manufacturing LLC, the retaining party argued that “that the
law is ‘clear in this district that an expert’s deposition preparation time and travel time are
reimbursable[,]’” while citing an authority in that federal district court. No. 2:13-cv-1189,
2018 WL 2093619, at *1 (S.D. Ohio May 7, 2018). Thus, the retaining party sought
“attorney’s fees for the costs incurred in bringing [a] Motion” to get its expert’s preparation
time and travel time paid. Id. Although it appears that the law in that particular district was
well-settled, the court nonetheless refused to award the retaining party the attorney’s fee it
incurred in bringing the motion, denying the motion “as unjust under the circumstances.” Id.
at *6 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(5)(A)(iii)).
200
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F. Move “Manifest Injustice” Language to the Part of the Rule to
Which it Relates
As discussed, the rule’s prefatory language of “unless manifest injustice
would result” is more problematic than not. Further, without a definition of
“manifest injustice,” it also is oddly out-of-place in a rule that pertains to
shifting of an expert’s discovery fees, and it sends the wrong signal to
litigants and courts about the courts’ role. Thus, the revised rule makes two
changes. First, it moves the phrase “unless manifest justice would result” to
the part of the rule to which it relates—the payment of fees. That is
consistent with the direction in the advisory notes to the current rule in
making clear that the standard has nothing to do with whether the fees are
objectively “reasonable,” but rather pertains solely to the deposing party’s
ability to pay. Second, and related to that, the rule expressly qualifies
“manifest justice” as relating to a party’s ability to pay.
The amended rule also adds in language to clarify the fee dispute
process when a party contends it should not have to pay because such
“manifest injustice would result.” Specifically, it makes clear that the
process for objecting to a fee request on “manifest injustice” grounds is the
same as the process for any other objection to fees.
G. Overall Benefits of the Proposed Amendments to the Rule
Taken together, these proposed changes to the rule will result in a fee
shifting that is not only clear, but that also better effectuates its purpose.
First, litigants will be on notice of what fees are covered by the rule as
well as the process for fee shifting. With a shared understanding of the
contours of the rule, very few disputes should arise under the rule. Moreover,
when such disputes do arise, the process for handling them will be clear, with
consequences attached to unreasonable demands or refusals under the rule.
Put differently, the fee shifting rule will be clear and, on the flip side, litigants
will have an incentive to play by the rule.
In addition, because the rule provides bright lines regarding what is
covered and what is presumptively reasonable, the rule will require little
court involvement. And when court involvement is necessary, it will be
streamlined. Courts will not have to interpret ambiguous provisions of the
rule.
Moreover, the rule’s parameters are fair. By ensuring that only fees
that are controlled by and of benefit to the deposing party are shifted, the rule
better serves its purpose. A rule that automatically shifts fee must be finetuned to ensure it properly incentivizes the parties.
Finally, these changes will provide uniformity in the rule. For almost
twenty-five years, such uniformity has been lacking in this rule’s
implementation. Aside from the fact that disputes about the rule’s meaning
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have been costly, such disputes have resulted in different courts adopting
conflicting interpretations of the rule. As a practical matter, that has meant
that the types of fees and the amount of fees shifted has been contingent on
which federal court happens to hear the case.

